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Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman
M.B.W. Sinclair*
The tort of seduction offers an excellent example of the pro-
cess of legal evolution. Originating in seventeenth century Eng-
land as an action by the father of the seduced woman for loss of
services, the tort has evolved through both legislative and judicial
decision into a moral, rather than an economic cause of action. In
modern times, it has fallen into disuse-perhaps even to extinc-
tion-at common law, and in some jurisdictions has been abolished
by statute. This article is a survey and analysis of the evolution of
the tort of seduction from mid-seventeenth century England to the
present day United States.
The thesis advanced is that the prevalent conception of wo-
men and their social role-the myth of the ideal woman-has con-
trolled the evolution of the tort of seduction. In the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, women were seen as property, eco-
nomically valuable for the services they could provide. Accord-
ingly, the cause of action for seduction belonged to the father and
was an action for loss of services, usually caused by pregnancy.
With the development of the Victorian ideal of the virtuous, deli-
cate, and submissive woman, the tort also changed. Legislation
provided for the victim herself to be the plaintiff, and for damages
to be based on the loss of virtue, not services. As twentieth cen-
tury women achieved a measure of sexual autonomy, the tort of
seduction became "as musty and out-of-date as Tennyson's 'Lady
of Shalott.' "l Many legislatures abolished or severely limited the
tort's availability, and common law seduction suits became increas-
ingly rare. Today the tort seems moribund.
Seduction is one of four causes of action traditionally grouped
under the rubric "heart balm:" they provide legal balms for bro-
ken, or at least bent, hearts. The other three "heart balm" actions
are criminal conversation, alienation of affections, and breach of
promise to marry.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. The
author would like to thank Kenneth A. Weller, J.D. Indiana University, 1985, for
his invaluable research assistance. The writing of this paper was supported, in part,
by an Indiana University Summer Faculty Fellowship.
1. Indianapolis News, Jan, 28, 1935, at 6, col. 6.
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Criminal conversation 2 is the civil cause of action correspond-
ing to the crime of adultery. Originally, only the husband had the
right of action,3 but modern courts extended it to the wife.4 Alien-
ation of affections, like criminal conversation, was a marital tort,
but it did not necessarily involve adultery. It originated as a cause
of action used by a husband against one who enticed his wife to
leave home, and like seduction, sought to redress the loss of serv-
ices. Services, however, included consortium. Defendants were
not limited to wives' lovers, but could include relatives or anyone
else who influenced the wife to leave.5 The action for alienation of
affections was also extended to women6 after, and perhaps because
of, the passage of Married Women's Statutes.7
Breach of promise to marry is a right of action of one rejected
against the former fianc6.8 It seems always to have been a wo-
man's cause of action. As Justice Atkins stated, "marriage to a wo-
man especially, is an advancement or preferment . .. .,9
Seduction, the other nonmarital heart balm action, is the subject
of the remainder of this paper.
The first section presents the common law history of seduc-
tion as a cause of action in England through the middle of the
nineteenth century and in the United States from its earliest oc-
curences through to the present. The second section covers the
changes state legislatures made to the tort in the nineteenth cen-
tury and its statutory abolition in the twentieth century. The final
section explains the evolution of the tort in terms of the develop-
ment of the myth of the ideal woman. The conclusion speculates
on the impact present day changes in social exigencies might have
on the law of seduction.
2. For a history of criminal conversation, see Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown
of Consortium, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 651 (1930); Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative At-
tack on "Heart Balm," 33 Mich. L. Rev. 979 (1935).
3. The husband possessed valuable but nonreciprocal rights in the wife. 3 Wil-
liam Blackstone, commentaries 138-43 (1768). As the wife could only sue through
the husband, to give her a right of action would allow the husband to profit from
his own wrong.
4. E.g., Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923). This extension
of the right of action to the wife might be attributed to the Married Women's Stat-
utes even though it is not expressly contained in them. See Homer Harrison Clark,
Law of Domestic Relations 268 (1968).
5. For a history of alienation of affections, see Robert C. Brown, The Action
for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 472 (1934).
6. E.g., Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891).
7. E.g., Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 557.1-.201 (1855); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 38-
101 to -108 (Burns 1852).
8. For a history of breach of promise to marry, see Robert C. Brown, Breach of
Promise Suits, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 474 (1929); Feinsinger, supra note 2, at 980-86.
9. Holcroft v. Dickenson, 1 Carter 233, 234, 124 Eng. Rep. 933, 934 (C.P. 1672).
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I. The Tort of Seduction: Common Law Development
This section examines the history of the tort of seduction as it
developed in judicial decisions. The first subsection covers the
common law development of the cause of action in England from
1653 to the middle of the nineteenth century. The second subsec-
tion covers the common law origins and early development of se-
duction in the United States. The final subsection covers the
common law development of the tort in the United States from
the mid-nineteenth century to the present.
A. Common Law Genesis in England
Although this article primarily treats the tort of seduction as
it developed in the United States, it is useful to begin with the
early English common law decisions, the precursors of the early
United States decisions.' 0 The tort of seduction originated as an
action for damages for the loss of the services of the seduced wo-
man-an action per quod servitium amisit, "whereby he lost the
service [of his servant]."" Norton v. Jason,12 the earliest reported
case using this theory, left open the possibility of the woman her-
self bringing suit for the seduction. 13 In question was the effect of
the statute of limitations: if the damage was in the seduction itself,
then it applied; if the damage was in the pregnancy, lying-in, and
the like, it did not. Chief Justice Roll held that Jason had no cause
of action for Norton's "assaulting his daughter, and getting her
10. Early American cases, e.g., Foster v. Scoffield, 1 Johns. 297 (N.Y. 1806); Wal-
lace v. Clark, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 93 (1807), had to rely on English cases, there being
no developed precedent here. Even after the establishment of an indigenous juris-
prudence of seduction, courts continued to cite the major English decisions. See,
e.g., Stevenson v. Belknap, 6 Iowa 97 (1858); Keller v. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211 (1853).
11. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). E.g., Norton v. Jason, 1 Sty. 398, 82
Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1653); Satterthwaite v. Dewhurst, 4 Dougl. 315, 316, 99 Eng.
Rep. 899, 900 (K.B. 1785) (Lord Mansfield: "[T]here is no precedent of such an ac-
tion, unless upon a per quod servitium amisit.").
12. 1 Sty. 398, 82 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1653).
13. There are earlier cases on different theories. For example, the 14th century
case of Lincoln v. Simond, KB 27/519, m.63 (Coram Rege roll, Hilary 1391), re-
printed in Morris S. Arnold, Selected Cases of Trespass from the King's Courts,
1307-1399, at 96 (1985), advances quite a different basis for the father's suit. Appar-
ently the defendant and plaintiff's daughter had married clandestinely, against the
father's wishes. The plaintiff father claimed that her marriage "belonged" to him,
that the "[defendant] ravished and abducted his daughter Alice found there," and
that because the prior betrothal of his daughter to the defendant prevented him
from marrying her to another, that betrothal "ought to be adjudged in law a ravish-
ment of Alice." Arnold, supra, at 96-97. Between that case and 1653, the idea of a
daughter's marriage being a property right in her father seems to have changed.
These very early cases surely had little influence on the tort as transported to the
United States.
1987]
Law and Inequality
with child, because this is a wrong particularly done to her .... "14
Jason's action for loss of services, however, was not barred.15
Although the implication was that an action by the daughter was
not precluded, such a cause was not pursued as civil seduction for
some two centuries. 16 Thus, the original basis of the action was
loss of services.
A successful plaintiff had to have some proof that services
were actually lost.17 The mere incurring of expense in looking af-
ter the woman during pregnancy and birth was not sufficient. For
example, where the woman was a servant in the household of an-
other,1S or where she supported herself independently at the time
of seduction,19 but went home for her pregnancy, the cause did not
lie. It follows that although the father2O would be the most com-
mon plaintiff,21 anyone who suffered a loss of the woman's serv-
ices would be a suitable plaintiff. Although it was to cause some
difficulty in the United States,22 this restriction of proper plaintiffs
to those who had actually lost the woman's services was generally
accepted by the early English courts. A widowed mother,23 a
14. 82 Eng. Rep. at 810.
15. Similarly, in Russell v. Come, 2 Ld. Raym. 1031, 92 Eng. Rep. 185 (K.B.
1703), although Chief Justice Holt, in dicta, stated that "a man cannot maintain an
action against another for assaulting his daughter and getting her with child," he
allowed the action for loss of services. 2 Ld. Raym. at 1032, 92 Eng. Rep. at 186.
16. E.g., Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa 337 (1856).
17. In Russell v. Come, 2 Ld. Raym. 1031, 92 Eng. Rep. 185 (K.B. 1703), Chief
Justice Holt suggested that the cause of action was really an aggravation of tres-
pass: "[B]ut [the father] may maintain an action against another for entering his
house and assaulting and getting his daughter with child per quod servitium amisit,
and that is a great aggravation." 2 Ld. Raym. at 1032, 92 Eng. Rep. at 186. This
notion had very little practical significance; for example, it would not apply to any
case in which the seduction took place off the father's premises.
18. E.g., Postlethwaite v. Parkes, 3 Burr. 1878, 97 Eng. Rep. 1147 (K.B. 1766);
Dean v. Peel, 5 East. 45, 102 Eng. Rep. 986 (K.B. 1804).
19. E.g., Grinnell v. Wells, 7 Man. & G. 1033, 135 Eng. Rep. 419 (C.P. 1844).
20. The mother of the victim could not be the plaintiff as she had no independ-
ent legal identity. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-
riage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband . 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries 430 (1766).
21. The father has "the benefit of his children's labour while they live with
him." Id. at 441.
22. E.g., Coon v. Moffitt, 3 N.J.L. 169 (1809).
23. E.g., Satterthwaite v. Dewhurst, 4 Dougl. 315, 99 Eng. Rep. 899 (K.B. 1785).
The plaintiff, a widowed mother, failed to allege either loss of services or the mi-
nority of her daughter (in which case she might have had the benefit of a presump-
tion of loss of services). Lord Mansfield dismissed the case with these striking
words: "This is an action brought by a third person for the incontinence of two
people, both of whom may possibly be of age; at least it does not appear that they
are otherwise. We are all of the opinion that this action cannot be maintained." 4
Dougl. at 317, 99 Eng. Rep. at 900. The court made no mention of the plaintiff's
status. In the much cited case of Bedford v. McKowl, 3 Esp. 119, 170 Eng. Rep. 560
[Vol. 5:33
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guardian, 24 an aunt for whom the niece worked as a servant,25 and
an uncle in whose household the woman lived,26 were all accepta-
ble plaintiffs.27
Because a loss of the service was the basis of the action, usu-
ally only seductions resulting in pregnancy were actionable. There
was at least one exception. In Manvell v. Thomson,28 the plain-
tiff's niece, after her abandonment by defendant, "was in a state of
very great agitation, and continued so for some time: that she re-
ceived medical attendance, and was obliged to be watched, lest she
should do herself some injury."29
One would expect that temporary injury to a son, for exam-
ple through a beating, would have similarly yielded damages for
loss of services. On the contrary, if a man's son were incapacitated,
the father did not have to allege or prove the loss of services; "it
was sufficient to shew the son lived in and was part of his father's
family."30
The origins of the tort of seduction appear to have been con-
strained mainly by requirements of form. Courts had to find,
within the limited range then available, a form suitable for bring-
ing the action. Basing seduction on loss of services soon came to be
seen as a "reasonable fiction . . . merely to bring the matter into
the Court."3 1 Although the requirement that the plaintiff suffer
loss of services was not abandoned, it came to be treated as a for-
mality. Provided that the plaintiff alleged some services lost, their
(N.P. 1800), the plaintiff was the mother and no comment is made thereon, but
whether she was widowed is not expressly stated. Later, in Andrews v. Askey, 8
Car. & P. 7, 173 Eng. Rep. 376 (N.P. 1837), a widowed mother prevailed.
24. E.g., Irwin v. Dearman, 11 East. 23, 103 Eng. Rep. 912 (K.B. 1809). One Ab-
bott, later to become Chief Justice of the King's Bench (better known as Lord
Tenterden), argued for defendant that it was anomalous to allow "one person to re-
cover damages for an injury done to another." 11 East. at 24, 103 Eng. Rep. at 912.
Compare his opinion as Chief Justice in Manvell v. Thomson, 2 Car. & P. 303, 172
Eng. Rep. 137 (N.P. 1826). See infra notes 26, 28-29 and accompanying text.
25. E.g., Edmondson v. Machell, 2 T.R. 4, 100 Eng. Rep. 2 (K.B. 1787).
26. E.g., Manvell v. Thomson, 2 Car. & P. 303, 172 Eng. Rep. 137 (N.P. 1826)
(Abbott, C.J.). Representing the defendant was a Mr. Denman who later, as Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, led the successful attack on Abbott's landmark opinion
in Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824); see Crook v. Jadis, 5
B. & Ad. 909, 110 Eng. Rep. 1028 (K.B. 1834); Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870,
111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836).
27. That the plaintiff was a parent, however, could have an impact on damages.
Bedford v. McKowl, 3 Esp. 119, 170 Eng. Rep. 560 (N.P. 1800). See infra note 40 and
accompanying text.
28. 2 Car. & P. 303, 172 Eng. Rep. 137 (N.P. 1826) (Abbott, C.J.).
29. 2 Car. & P. at 304, 172 Eng. Rep. at 137. Apparently the cause of the dis-
tress and loss of services was not so much the seduction itself as its non-continu-
ance. Nevertheless, plaintiff won 400 pounds damages.
30. Jones v. Brown, 1 Esp. 217, 219, 170 Eng. Rep. 334, 334 (N.P. 1794).
31. Revill v. Sattergit, Holt 451, 453, 171 Eng. Rep. 301, 303 (N.P. 1816).
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required quantity was minimal. "The slightest evidence is suffi-
cient; even milking cows."32 The strictness of the requirement was
further ameliorated by holding that if the woman "was living with
her father, forming part of his family, and liable to his control and
command," 33 services would be assumed. "The right to the service
[was] sufficient."34 Otherwise a wealthy father whose daughter
provided no services would have no cause of action for her seduc-
tion.35 Nevertheless, the formal requirement had to be met, and
failure to do so meant non-suit.36
Once the plaintiff had overcome this formal problem of proof,
damage awards bore little relation to the actual value of services
lost. In Tullidge v. Wade,37 Chief Justice Wilmot, upholding a
jury award of 50 pounds, said: "[A]lthough the plaintiff's loss in
this case may not really amount to the value of twenty shillings,
yet the jury have done right in giving liberal damages."38 Simi-
larly, an award of 400 pounds in 1826 must have far exceeded the
value of lost household services of a sixteen-year-old.39 In 1800,
Lord Eldon explained:
32. Bennett v. Allcott, 2 T.R. 166, 168, 100 Eng. Rep. 90, 91 (K.B. 1787).
33. Maunder v. Venn, 1 M. & M. 323, 324, 173 Eng. Rep. 1175, 1175 (N.P. 1829).
34. Id. This latter point was taken up enthusiastically in the United States
courts to allow a father's action when a minor daughter was seduced while living
and working in the home of another. Coon v. Moffitt, 3 N.J.L. 169 (1809) (espe-
cially the opinion of Pennington, J.); Martin v. Payne, 9 Johns. 387 (N.Y. 1812); Sar-
gent v. Denniston, 5 Cow. 106, 8 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 590 (1825). The father still had the
right to control his daughter's behavior, and thus to command her services. Black-
stone, supra note 20, at 441. The same argument seems not to have persuaded Eng-
lish courts. In Grinnell v. Wells, 7 Man. & G. 1033, 135 Eng. Rep. 419 (C.P. 1844),
plaintiff won at trial but lost on appeal because the 14-year-old daughter was work-
ing and living elsewhere when seduced, notwithstanding the fact that, once preg-
nant, she moved home; the seduction caused no loss of services to the father.
35. E.g., Revill v. Sattergitt, 1 Holt 451, 171 Eng. Rep. 301 (N.P. 1816).
36. Failure to allege and prove services lost completely barred the action. Pos-
tlethwaite v. Parkes, 3 Burr. 1878, 97 Eng. Rep. 1147 (K.B. 1766), Dean v. Peel, 5
East. 45, 102 Eng. Rep. 986 (K.B. 1804), Eager v. Grimwood, 1 Ex. 61, 154 Eng. Rep.
26 (Exch. 1847). The unreality of all this was clearly argued in Grinnell v. Wells, 7
Man. & G. 1033, 135 Eng. Rep. 419 (C.P. 1844), which nevertheless followed the
rule: no services proven, no damages. The requirements of formality, no matter
how atrophied their rationale, proved difficult to eliminate.
37. 3 Wils. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769).
38. Id. at 19, 95 Eng. Rep. at 909. Justice Clive, concurring, said that he would
have upheld an award of 100 pounds.
39. Manvell v. Thomson, 2 Car. & P. 303, 172 Eng. Rep. 137 (N.P. 1826). It is
not possible to give even a rough modern equivalent of 400 English pounds at the
beginning of the 19th century. However, an indication might be gleaned from Gold-
smith's lines:
A man he was, to all the country dear,
And passing rich with forty pounds a year.
Oliver Goldsmith, "The Deserted Village," lines 141-42 (1770). Goldsmith was la-
menting a passing era, so presumably in 1770, 40 pounds a year would no longer
count as rich. But allowing for a twofold error and substantial inflation, a rich
SEDUCTION
In point of form, the action only purports to give a recompence
for loss of service; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that
this is an action brought by a parent for an injury to her child:
in such a case ... the jury may take into their consideration all
that she can feel from the nature of the loss. They may look
upon her as a parent losing the comfort as well as the service
of her daughter, in whose virtue she can feel no consolation;
and as the parent of other children, whose morals may be cor-
rupted by her example. 4
0
Jury awards of damages for dishonor and distress rather than
for the mere loss of services tended to be upheld. In Andrews v.
Askey,41 damages "ultra loss of services" were allowed "for the dis-
tress and anxiety of mind which the [plaintiff] mother has felt."42
As Lord Ellenborough said in Irwin v. Dearman,43 although "even
in the case of an actual parent, the loss of service [was] the legal
foundation of the action," the practice of giving greater damages
was "inveterate and [could] not now be shaken." 44 By the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, more was involved in the social re-
ality of the tort than mere loss of services.
An exemplary or punitive element in damage awards was
also acceptable.45 "Actions of this sort [were] brought for exam-
ple's sake; ... and if A.B. brings another action against defendant
for the breach of promise of marriage, so much the better; he
ought to be punished twice." 46 Thus, it was appropriate to take
into consideration the wealth and social status of the defendant.
For example, in Edmondson v. Machell, 47 the defendant's commis-
sion as a captain in the militia required 300 pounds a year, and the
jury awarded the same amount in damages. 48 English judges, how-
ever, resisted setting up strict rules to determine damages in se-
duction suits: "[I]f there was any case in which great latitude
might be allowed to juries, it was in this species of action."4 9 By
man's annual income must have been on the order of no more than one or two hun-
dred pounds in the early part of the 19th century.
40. Bedford v. McKowl, 3 Esp. 119, 120, 170 Eng. Rep. 560, 560 (N.P. 1800). The
court approved 400 pounds in damages.
41. 8 Car. & P. 8, 173 Eng. Rep. 376, (N.P. 1837).
42. Id. at 9, 173 Eng. Rep. at 377.
43. 11 East 23, 103 Eng. Rep. 912 (K.B. 1809).
44. Id. at 24, 103 Eng. Rep. at 912.
45. Elliott v. Nicklin, 5 Price 641, 146 Eng. Rep. 719 (Exch. 1818) (opinion of
Baron Garrow).
46. Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 18, 19, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769) (Lord Chief
Justice Wilmot).
47. 2 T.R. 4, 100 Eng. Rep. 2 (K.B. 1787).
48. Id. at 4, 100 Eng. Rep. at 3; see also Andrews v. Askey, 8 Car. & P. 8, 173
Eng. Rep. 376 (N.P. 1837).
49. Elliott, 5 Price at 645, 146 Eng. Rep. at 721 (summary of opinion of Baron
Graham).
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the early nineteenth century the cause of action seemed more a
matter of morals and honor than of economic injury. 50
The early courts were aware of how easily seduction could be
confused with breach of promise to marry. In particular, the ques-
tion arose whether evidence of defendant's promise to marry the
woman should be admissible in seduction trials. It was thought
that the jury ought not to award damages related to breach of
promise to marry to the father when the woman herself could still
bring an independant action. In Tullidge v. Wade,51 the court held
that evidence of a promise of marriage was admissible to demon-
strate the defendant's seductive artifices and intentions, but could
not be considered in assessing damages. Recognizing that a jury
would have difficulty drawing such a distinction, Lord Ellenbor-
ough, in oft-quoted language, further limited admissible testimony:
"I think you may ask her whether he paid his addresses to her in
an honourable way. Further than that you can on no account
go." 52 This rule was not considered inflexible,53 and it was later
held that evidence of a promise to marry may be admitted where it
"is not relied on as a prominent part of the case, but is merely col-
lateral to the main object of the action [as, for example, to] vindi-
cate the character of the young woman." 5 4
This illustrates the confusion between seduction as an eco-
nomic and as a moral offense. If the action were based solely in
the economic offense of deprivation of services, 55 then the nature
of the defendant's wiles or the woman's character should have
been completely irrelevant. Only paternity would have been at is-
sue. The confusion generated by this transition is exemplified by
Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Dodd v. Norris:56 not only did he
50. The confusion caused by this transition is apparent in damage awards. In
1809 Lord Ellenborough had expressly upheld a damage award "ultra the mere loss
of service," Irwin v. Dearman, 11 East 23, 24, 103 Eng. Rep. 912, 912 (K.B. 1809).
Nine years later, in 1818, an award of 1,000 pounds was upheld where plaintiff, a
father of seven, was a poor publican, and defendant the son of "a man of considera-
ble property." Elliott, 5 Price at 642, 146 Eng. Rep. at 720. The pregnancy was also
said to have been difficult and the delivery dangerous.
51. 3 Wils. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769).
52. Dodd v. Norris, 3 Camp. 519, 520, 170 Eng. Rep. 1467, 1467 (N.P. 1814).
53. Elliott, 5 Price at 647, 146 Eng. Rep. at 721 (opinion of Baron Garrow who
had been of counsel for the plaintiff in Dodd, 3 Camp. at 519, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1467.
He noted in Elliott that "Lord Ellenborough on that occasion did not . . . lay it
down as an inflexible rule." 5 Price at 647, 146 Eng. Rep. at 721).
54. 5 Price at 647, 146 Eng. Rep. at 721.
55. Economic loss was also at issue in the 14th century case Lincoln v. Simond,
KB 27/519, m.63 (Coram Rege roll, Hilary 1391), reprinted in Arnold, supra note
13, at 96, where the action was based on the deprivation of the valuable right to the
daughter's marriage.
56. 3 Camp. 519, 170 Eng. Rep. 1467 (N.P. 1814).
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hold that the woman may say only whether the defendant's ad-
dresses were honorable and not whether he promised to marry her
(a permission based on morality), he also held that she did not
have to answer whether at the time she had "been criminal with
other men"57 (a limitation based in economics).
In early nineteenth century England, the tort of seduction
was well on the way to being based in morality and honor despite
its historical roots in the economics of lost services. This then was
the common law tort of seduction that was imported into the
United States.
B. Early Common Law Development in the United States
In the United States the earliest case law developed concur-
rently with the English, and in much the same way.5 8 The same
transition from the purely economic basis of per quod servitium
amisit to the offense against morality and honor is evident. The
United States courts developed these themes in much the same
way, though somewhat more forthrightly, than the English courts.
In the United States, the formal basis of the tort of seduction
in loss of services seems originally to have been taken more seri-
ously than in England,5 9 but the avoidance of the harsh effects
seems correspondingly to have been more overt. Fathers were the
standard plaintiffs, and others in loco parentis, after some early
resistance,6 0 were also acceptable.61 The required relationship was
57. Id.
58. For example, the 1791 New Jersey case, Stout v. Prall, 1 N.J.L. 93 (1791),
was a typical suit by a father based on loss of services. The defendant appealed the
award of excess damages, especially in light of his poverty. With no reference to
English decisions, the court said that damages need not equal "the pecuniary loss to
the parent," but that the jury properly "might give exemplary damages, such as
would amply recompense the plaintiff for the cruel and severe injury of disturbing
the peace of his family, and destroying his parental prospects." Id. at 94. The
award was 100 pounds. Given the time, this opinion was concurrent with, if not a
little ahead of, King's Bench thinking. Defendant's poverty was held irrelevant.
Damages based on the moral offense were called "exemplary," but, as the irrele-
vance of defendant's economic standing shows, were not openly considered
punitive.
59. Occasional early opinions, however, recognized its fictional character and
expressed disapproval. See, e.g., VanHorn v. Freeman, 6 N.J.L. 322 (1796).
60. See, e.g., Vossel v. Cole, 10 Mo. 634 (1847) (holding that a widowed mother
had no cause of action when the father was alive at the time of seduction). Contra
Coon v. Moffitt, 3 N.J.L. 169 (1809); Justice Pennington's opinion is a textbook of
the law at that time, id. at 175, and convincingly refutes the Missouri Supreme
Court's reasoning. Nevertheless the latter did not change position 18 years later in
Heinrichs v. Kerchner, 35 Mo. 378 (1865).
61. The earliest and most acceptable plaintiff was the widowed mother. E.g.,
Coon, 3 N.J.L. at 169; Keller v. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211 (1853). Also accepted were a
brother, Millar v. Thompson, 1 Wend. 447 (N.Y. 1828) (but plaintiff failed to prove
19871
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that the woman be subject to the plaintiff's control so that he
could, if he wished, call upon her services. Absent such legal con-
trol, plaintiff would have to show actual services lost. This distinc-
tion between using the seduced woman's services and having the
right to use them was developed with a great deal more precision
in the United States than in England.
If the woman were a minor, then the father was almost al-
ways entitled to her services, even when she was away from home
working for another. In Martin v. Payne,6 2 the woman was living
at her uncle's, working casually, but with no intention of returning
home.63 The decision held to the rule that, where the woman was
under twenty-one, "[s]he was [her father's] servant de jure, though
not de facto . -64 The following year, the same New York court
reinforced this position by reversing, per curiam, a jury verdict for
the plaintiff on very similar facts, but with the daughter over the
age of twenty-one. 65 If the daughter had attained her majority, ac-
tual services owed to the plaintiff had to be proved.6 6 Where serv-
ices had to be proved, the United States courts uniformly followed
the English view that "slight evidence will suffice, such as making
tea, mending clothes, or other such like acts." 67
Where the woman was under the age of majority the plaintiff
father could only fail to benefit from the presumption of services
de jure if he had expressly contracted his rights to another, as by
indenture or apprenticeship. In such a case, the master to whom
the parental right had been granted would be the appropriate
actual services lost where his sister was 22 years old); a cousin, Davidson v. Goodall,
18 N.H. 423 (1846); a brother-in-law, Wilson v. Sproul, 3 Pen. & W. 49 (Pa. 1831);
Ball v. Bruce, 21 Ill. 161 (1859).
62. 9 Johns. 387 (N.Y. 1812).
63. The facts are remarkably similar to those in Dean v. Peel, 5 East. 45, 102
Eng. Rep. 986 (K.B. 1804), and an earlier case, Postlethwaite v. Parkes, 3 Burr. 1878,
97 Eng. Rep. 1147 (K.B. 1766). The two cases were both commonly noted by the
United States courts; the latter case, however, was compromised, Lord Mansfield
deliberately avoiding a decision in order to save assessing costs against the impover-
ished plaintiff. The New York court in Martin v. Payne noted Dean with disap-
proval but distinguished it thus: in Dean, it was said, the woman had been
contractually obligated to her employer and only went home when pregnant,
whereas in Martin, she had only a casual working relationship with her uncle.
64. 9 Johns. at 390.
65. Nickleson v. Stryker, 10 Johns. 115 (N.Y. 1813).
66. Id. See also Applegate v. Ruble, 9 Ky. 128 (1819); Moran v. Dawes, 4 Cow.
412, 8 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 432 (1825); Wilson v. Sproul, 3 Pen. & W. 49 (Pa. 1831); Keller
v. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211 (1853).
67. Ball v. Bruce, 21 Ill. 161, 162 (1859); see also Wallace v. Clarke, 2 Tenn. (2
Overt.) 93 (1807); Wilson, 3 Pen. & W. at 49; Keller, 5 Md. at 211. Where plaintiffs
failed, as in Wilson, it seems to have been a failure in pleading or offering proof
rather than in an attempted proof's not meeting the standard.
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plaintiff. 68 The rule was strictly construed by the courts. For ex-
ample, in Clark v. Fitch,69 such an employment arrangement was
characterized from the parent's point of view as merely a license,
not a contract, and thus revocable at will. What was required was
that the plaintiff parent have granted his parental authority to
another.
Even when such a grant of parental authority had been made,
the courts found ways to maintain the viability of the plaintiff par-
ent's suit. In Emery v. Gowen,70 the seduced woman had, at six-
teen, been indentured to her uncle, and the indenture was still
intact at the time of her seduction and the litigation. However, she
had left her uncle's house when he beat her, and, with no inten-
tion of returning home,7 L had gone to live with her grandfather,
with whom she stayed until returning home pregnant at age
twenty. The trial court summarily dismissed the seduction action.
The Maine Supreme Court reversed, saying that the decision de-
pended on plaintiff father's having transferred his parental rights.
Both the uncle and the father had not treated the indenture as
such a transfer; thus, the father retained the right to the daugh-
ter's services as a matter of law.72
In Sargent v. Denniston,73 the plaintiff, a widowed mother,
had indentured her daughter Eliza as a servant at age eleven. At
age sixteen, Eliza returned home pregnant, her indentures can-
celled by her employer for that reason. In a well-reasoned opin-
ion, Justice Sutherland used the timing of the loss of services to
avoid the effect of the supposed rule: no services were lost at the
time of the seduction itself, but only at the time of lying-in and
birth. To determine who was the proper plaintiff solely at the
time of seduction would be to deny a cause of action to the parent
of a daughter who changed employment after seduction but before
lying-in. In such circumstances, the loss would be the same but
68. Keller, 5 Md. at 211; Emery v. Gowen, 4 Me. 30, 4 Greenl. 33 (1826). This
again is stronger than the basis on which Dean v. Peel was distinguished by the
New York court in Martin v. Payne. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. In
Dean, all the court required was that the woman have a contractual employment
relation with the other.
69. 2 Wend. 459, 10 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 195 (1829).
70. 4 Me. at 30, 4 Greenl. at 33.
71. Just as in Dean v. Peel, 102 Eng. Rep. 986, but the Maine court followed the
United States rule (as in Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459, 10 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 195 (1829))
rather than the English.
72. 4 Me. at 37, 4 Greenl. at 40. Had the daughter remained in the employ of
her uncle then he, and not the father, would have had the cause of action. Id. at 40,
4 Greenl. at 43.
73. 5 Cow. 106, 8 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 590 (1825).
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there would be no proper plaintiff.7 4
It cannot, therefore, be necessary to the theory or just princi-
ples by which this action is regulated, that the parent, in order
to sustain it, should be entitled to the services of the daughter
at the very instant when the act is committed which subse-
quently results in a loss of service or necessary pecuniary
disbursements. 75
On this argument, provided the young woman actually went home
once pregnant, no assignment of rights or employment contract
could inhibit the cause of action. If she did not return home, then
her employer would be the proper plaintiff.
These developments led the Illinois Supreme Court to say in
1846 that for a woman under the age of majority, basing the tort of
seduction in loss of services had virtually disappeared: "But this
doctrine has latterly been so completely frittered away by numer-
ous decisions, both in this country and in England, that hardly a
vestige of it now remains.''76 This obituary seems to have been
premature. The court must have been unaware of the survival of
the strict traditional doctrine in English decisions.77 In 1850, the
New York Court of Appeals 78 followed the English 79 rather than
the United States cases to the opposite conclusion. It expressly re-
jected Justice Sutherland's argument8 0 as insupportable "without
an entire departure from the principle on which the action rests.
There was no relation of master and servant between the plaintiff
and the daughter, either actual or constructive at the time of the
seduction."81 Chief Justice Bronson's long opinion held the tort to
74. Id. at 117, 8 N.Y.C.L. Rep. at 594; Justice Pennington made a similar argu-
ment in 1809: "Supposing a person should be bound a servant to A. for a month,
and by the same indenture, also be bound to serve B. for a certain time, immedi-
ately succeeding the expiration of the service to A., and should be beat and
wounded at the last hour of expiration of the service to A., by which he would not
be able to perform the service due to B.; could B. maintain an action for this loss of
service? I can perceive no reason why B. should not maintain this action ......
Coon v. Moffitt, 3 N.J.L. 169, 177 (1809).
75. 5 Cow. at 117-18, 8 N.Y.C.L. Rep. at 594.
76. Anderson v. Ryan, 8 Ill. 583, 586 (1846).
77. E.g., Grinnell v. Wells, 7 Man. & G. 1033, 135 Eng. Rep. 419 (C.P. 1844) (a
stepfather who purported to indenture his stepdaughter to serve another was not a
proper plaintiff, but would have been if he had been the natural father).
78. Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 N.Y. 38 (1850); see also Heinrichs v. Kerchner, 35
Mo. 378 (1865) (a mother had no parental authority over, or right of action for, her
daughter's seduction where the father was alive at the time of the seduction but
died before the birth).
79. Grinnell, 7 Man. & G. at 1033, 135 Eng. Rep. at 419; Eager v. Grimwood, 1
Ex. 61, 154 Eng. Rep. 26 (Exch. 1847).
80. Sargent v. Denniston, 5 Cow. 106, 8 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 590 (1825). See supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
81. Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 N.Y. at 46. The tone of the opinion is very hostile to
the cause of action and in illustrations accepts the very hypothetical Justice Suther-
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be founded strictly in the loss of services, 82 requiring a master-ser-
vant relationship between the plaintiff and the woman, but only at
the time of the seduction. Yet in similar circumstances, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court wrote: "Our laws cannot be subjected to the
reproach that they afford no remedy for so flagrant a wrong
.... ,"83 Clearly, the confusion that developed during the evolution
of the tort from a purely economic foundation to a moral one was
rife in the United States courts.
The early United States common law decisions also kept to
the historical basis in limiting the range of allowable defenses and
correspondingly, the types of evidence admissible. If the cause of
action was for services lost because of pregnancy resulting from
the defendant's seduction of the woman, then her chastity at or
prior to the time of seduction should have been irrelevant. Simi-
larly, the seductive artifices used by defendant, especially a prom-
ise of marriage, should also have been irrelevant. This reasoning
was followed in the United States more strictly than in England,
and evidence of these matters of morality was generally excluded.
When a defendant tried to put the moral character of the se-
duced woman in issue, the early United States decisions drew an
interesting distinction.84 If the evidence was intended as a defense
it was inadmissible as irrelevant,8 5 but if it was introduced for the
purpose of reducing damages for loss of honor or mental and fa-
milial distress, then it was relevant and admissible.8 6 Only if the
plaintiff sought such damages would the defendant be permitted to
challenge the woman's virtue, and then the appropriate evidence
would be of her reputation rather than actual sexual activity.8 7
This position seems to have been generally accepted.8 8
land regarded as outrageous: the woman's employer is the seducer, but terminates
the employment once she becomes pregnant; the parent, who suffers both in honor
and pocket, has no cause of action. Termination of employment, in the view of
Chief Justice Bronson of the New York Court of Appeals in 1850, would insulate
the defendant. Id.
82. There is a note of morality at the end where Bronson suggests that the wo-
man's willingness at the time of the seduction would be a defense. 4 N.Y. at 50.
83. Ball v. Bruce, 21 Ill. 161, 163 (1859) (action for seduction may be maintained
not only by a natural parent but also by a guardian standing in loco parentis to the
person seduced).
84. E.g., Akerley v. Haines, 2 Cai. R. 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Seagar v. Sliger-
land, 2 Cai. R. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Wallace v. Clark, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 93
(1807).
85. E.g., Drish v. Davenport, 2 Stew. 266 (Ala. 1830); Wallace, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.)
at 93; Akerley, 2 Cai. R. at 291.
86. E.g., Akerley, 2 Cai. R. at 291; Wallace, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) at 93.
87. E.g., Drish, 2 Stew. at 266.
88. A counter indication can be found in Haynes v. Sinclair, 23 Vt. 108 (1850),
where the court held that a plaintiff could only give evidence of the woman's prior
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This position rests on the assumption that damages ultra
services are for actual suffering and are not exemplary or punitive.
To some extent this may have been because the defendants in
some circumstances were subject to criminal prosecution for se-
duction or fornication.8 9 For example, in an early New Jersey case
defense witnesses were excused from testifying as to their rela-
tions with the plaintiff's daughter because of the possibility of
prosecution for fornication.9 0 Thus, the seduced woman's morality
was not generally at issue. However, the plaintiff parent's consent
to the woman's "debauchery" was, predictably, an admissible and
effective defense.91 Actual parental consent was required; mere
lack of ordinary prudence in supervising the young woman would
not do.92
Unlike their English predecessors, United States courts also
tended to take an unequivocal attitude toward the admissibility of
evidence of the defendant's promise of marriage. From the very
earliest cases, the possibility that the jury might award damages
for breach of promise of marriage when the seduced woman still
had an independent cause of action in her own right for that
breach resolved the question.93 Promise of marriage as a weapon
of seduction was not mentionable at a trial.94 This position was
held more firmly than in the English courts,95 and a special in-
struction to the jury would not suffice.96
Damage awards in the early United States decisions were
similar to the English. Damages bore little relation to actual serv-
virtue if it had been attacked by defendant, thus indicating that such an attack
might be acceptable.
89. Such prosecutions were rare at these early dates and seem only to have be-
come common under state statutes in the second half of the 19th century.
90. Vaughn v. Perrine, 3 N.J.L. 299, 2 Penning. 728 (1811). In Wilson v. Sproul,
3 Pen. & W. 49 (Pa. 1831), it was held irrelevant that the defendant had previously
been prosecuted for "fornication and bastardy" with the fine going to the seduced
woman.
91. E.g., Akerley v. Haines, 2 Cai. R. 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Seagar v. Sliger-
land, 2 Cai. R. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); McCrae v. Lilly, 23 N.C.(1 Ired.) 118 (1840);
Hollis v. Wells, 3 Clark 169, 5 Pa. Law J. 30 (1845).
92. E.g., Parker v. Elliott, 6 Va. 867, 6 Munf. 587 (1820).
93. E.g., Foster v. Scoffield, 1 Johns. 297 (N.Y. 1806).
94. E.g., Drish v. Davenport, 2 Stew. 266 (Ala. 1830); Gillet v. Mead, 7 Wend.
193, 11 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 102 (1831); Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459 (N.Y. 1829); Foster, 1
Johns. 297; Haynes v. Sinclair, 23 Vt. 108 (1850). But see Mudd v. Clements, 17 F.
Cas. 954 (C.C.D.C. 1826) (No. 9900) (promise of marriage was admissible to show a
means of seduction).
95. Compare Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 18, 19, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 909 (K.B. 1769)
(admission into evidence of promise of marriage during seduction suit was errone-
ous but not reversible error).
96. E.g., Kip v. Berdan, 20 N.J.L. 239 (1843).
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ices lost and appealing their excess was ineffective.97 Exemplary
damages were accepted, 98 although they were characterized as
compensation for distress and loss of honor.9 9 On occasion, courts
openly acknowledged that seduction damages could be punitive. 0 0
In such cases, evidence of the defendant's economic and social posi-
tion was admissible because "wealth and standing in society will,
in a considerable degree, determine the amount of damages." 1l
For example, where a defendant was shown to have a net worth of
$18,000, a damage award of $1,800 was held appropriate. 102 As with
the English cases, the United States decisions tended to ignore the
economics of lost services in favor of honor and morality when the
question turned to damages.
The tort of seduction evolved in the United States from the
same roots as it did in England. Although theoretically and proce-
durally the tort provided a remedy for the loss of services conse-
quent upon seduction and pregnancy, morality was inescapably
involved, especially in damage awards. The United States deci-
sions tended to be more formal in characterizing the action and in
determining the admissibility of evidence, using a strict, historical
theory of the action. They were, however, more imaginative in
justifying exceptions to the formal constraints of that theory. For
example, the more adventuresome jurists argued on the basis of
actual losses for a liberalization of the class of possible plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, despite the intrusion of morality in some of its as-
pects, the tort still remained rooted to the old writ: per quod servi-
tium amisit. No appellate cases seeking damages simply for the
loss of virginity or family honor in the absence of a subsequent
pregnancy or other incapacity can be found in the early common
law period. Nor are there reports of actions brought by the se-
duced woman on her own behalf.103
97. E.g., Applegate v. Ruble, 9 Ky. 563 (1819); McRae v. Lilly, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.)
118 (1840); Keller v. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211 (1853).
98. E.g., Stout v. Prall, 1 N.J.L. 93 (1791); Clark, 2 Wend. at 459; Applegate, 9
Ky. at 563; Stevenson v. Belknap, 6 Iowa 97 (1858).
99. E.g., Stout, 1 N.J.L. at 93.
100. E.g., Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill. 372 (1842); Stevenson, 6 Iowa at 97.
101. Grable, 4 Ill. at 373.
102. Applegate, 9 Ky. at 563.
103. However, by midcentury, seduction had begun to appear in breach of prom-
ise to marry actions as a source of increased damages. Michael Grossberg, Gov-
erning the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 45-49
(1985).
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C. The Development of the Tort in Common Law
After 1850
As of the middle of the nineteenth century, the common law
tort of seduction had reached a relatively stable compromise be-
tween its origins in the writ of per quod servitium amisit and the
moral offense, but the formal basis in loss of services was still
dominant. Statutory revision104 began in Michigan and Virginia in
1846 and 1849 respectively, with the the passage of statutes remov-
ing the requirement of alleging loss of services.105 Alabama and
Iowa followed; in 1852 Alabama permitted the seduced woman to
sue in her own right,106 and in 1851, Iowa provided for both of
these revisions.' 0 7 Clearly, these statutes directed attention away
from the economic basis and toward the moral; the same refocus-
ing occurred in the courts.
From the mid nineteenth century on, the moral and honorific
aspects of seduction became progressively more dominant in the
common law, but until very recently, never quite displaced the
economic roots. Today, seduction remains a common law tort in
eighteen states' 0 8 and the District of Columbia. In most of these
jurisdictions the cause of action is now moribund, if not necessarily
extinct.
The first noticeable change after the initial common law pe-
riod exemplifies the gradual shift from economic to moral offense.
Many decisions kept to the traditional requirement of proof of a
loss of capacity to work;109 mere shame and dishonor were not
enough.110 Thus, a pregnancy or incapacitating venereal infection
consequent upon the seduction was essential to the action."' The
seductive technique of the defendant and the consent of the wo-
man were utterly irrelevant.112 However, courts also began to em-
104. See infra notes 209-36 and accompanying text.
105. Mich. Rev. Stat. §§ 6195-6197 (1846); Va. Code tit. 44, ch. 148, § 1 (1849).
106. Ala. Code pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2133 (1852).
107. Iowa Code tit. 19, ch. 100, §§ 1696-1697 (1851). Many states enacted similar
provisions in the latter part of the 19th century.
108. Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland (in 1857
Maryland enacted a statute-now part of Md. Fain. Law Code Ann. § 5-206 (1984)-
expressly recognizing the common law cause of action), Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
109. E.g., Abrahams v. Kidney, 104 Mass. 222 (1870); Wendt v. Lentz, 197 Wis.
569, 222 N.W. 798 (1929).
110. E.g., Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 413 (1856), revg 15 Barb. 279 (N.Y. App. Div.
1853).
111. E.g., White v. Nellis, 31 Barb. 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1859), aff'd, 31 N.Y. 405
(1865).
112. E.g., Koenke v. Bauer, 162 Mo. App. 718, 145 S.W. 506 (Ct. App. 1912); Auley
v. Birkhead, 35 N.C. 28 (1851); Reed v. Williams, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 580 (1858).
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phasize the everyday notion of seduction, holding that unless the
plaintiff could show that it was the defendant's use of some seduc-
tive artifice that made the woman submit despite her better judg-
ment, the cause of action failed.li 3 On this view, the woman's
consenting to intercourse would be a relevant defense,1 1 4 as would
her prior lack of chastity.1 1 5 Yet, despite this shift of emphasis
(and in the absence of statutory authorization), there is a paucity
of cases involving no incapacity or loss of some services.1 1 6 The
plaintiff still had to allege and show loss of services or the right
thereto.1 1 7
As the emphasis shifted from the economic basis of services
to morals, and as legislatures began to recognize that the cause of
action should belong to the woman, one would also expect that the
courts would have begun to entertain suits by the seduced woman.
This would surely have been the reasonable course where the of-
fense was moral and the woman an emancipated adult. Yet the
courts steadfastly continued to refuse to recognize the woman vic-
tim as plaintiff.3-s There are really only two true exceptions, but a
number of psuedo-exceptions also are instructive.
The first exception was Smith v. Richards,119 an 1860 Con-
necticut Supreme Court decision with facts as egregious as can be
imagined. Involved were two fourteen-year-old girls, both or-
phans, both in the care of a charitable home.1 20 Richards was in
the practice of obtaining such girls on the pretense of offering
them a suitable home and protection in return for services, but in
reality to seduce, debauch, and introduce them to prostitution.
The court found that the young women were damaged, not by
113. E.g., Bell v. Rinker, 29 Ind. 267 (1868); Smith v. Young, 26 Mo. App. 575 (Ct.
App. 1887); Franklin v. McCorkle, 84 Tenn. 609, 1 S.W. 250 (1886); Rockwell v. Day,
101 Wash. 580, 172 P. 754 (1918).
114. E.g., Lawyer v. Fritcher, 130 N.Y. 239, 29 N.E. 267 (1891).
115. E.g., White v. Murtland, 71 Ill. 250 (1874); Owens v. Fanning, (Mo. Ct. App.
1918) (defendant was not permitted to introduce evidence of the woman's reputa-
tion "after her ruin"); Finch v. Gibson, 140 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W. 759 (1918) (prior
virginity a material element).
116. But see Ogborn v. Francis, 44 N.J.L. 441 (1882).
117. E.g., Simpson v. Grayson, 54 Ark. 404, 16 S.W. 4 (1891); Beaudette v. Gagne,
87 Me. 534, 33 A. 23 (1895) (when the daughter is of the legal age of majority, she
must be in plaintiff's household); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369 (1868);
Blagge v. Ilsley, 127 Mass. 191 (1879); Tillotson v. Currin, 176 N.C. 479, 97 S.E. 395
(1918); Mohry v. Hoffman, 86 Pa. 358 (1878).
118. The first genuine extension of the right of action to the seduced woman did
not occur until 1977. See Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
119. 29 Conn. 232 (1860).
120. The suit was brought by the girls' next friend on a promissory note given in
settlement of the prior seduction action; the defense was want of consideration,
there being no action for seduction available to the party seduced. Thus, the pro-
priety of the victims' seduction action was directly in issue.
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pregnancy or venereal infection, but in their "disgrace, and in loss
of virtue and of character and of peace of mind, and . . . greatly
injured . . . health."' 21 The court's outrage is readily apparent.
Although the opinion states that "there may be circumstances con-
nected with the act of such a character as to take the case out of
the general rule"122 for seduction suits, the actual basis for its deci-
sion was the identification of the cause of action with fraud and
deceit.123
The second true exception, Graham v. Wallace,124 is almost
as egregious. The plaintiff was orphaned at fourteen; the defend-
ant, the husband of a relative, was her court-appointed guardian.
There was no claim of pregnancy or other incapacity. The court
said: "There being no parent or master to bring the action, if the
ward may not maintain it, no one else can."125 Furthermore, in
these circumstances "the guardian into whose custody and control
the court delivered the infant may claim and exercise the privilege
of seducing his ward without becoming responsible to the infant in
a civil action for damages for the wrong and injury."126 There is a
discussion of guardianship law, including the obligation of the
guardian to "promote the moral welfare" of the ward-a duty the
ward cannot waive-so that her alleged consent "under such cir-
cumstances is no consent, and should stand for naught."127 Thus
the court found, as an exception to the general rule, that "[h]e has
willfully corrupted her morals where it was his duty to guard and
protect them, and he must make some reparation, though inade-
quate, by being held to answer to her in damages."' 28 Who could
disagree?
Just how narrowly the exception in Graham v. Wallace was
construed is shown by the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in
Welsund v. Schueller.129 The plaintiff was, at the time of seduc-
tion, a sixteen-year-old immigrant who spoke no English and had
only one relative in the United States, an uncle who depended on
121. 29 Conn. at 234. In an unnumbered footnote, the court approved of this lan-
guage used in the declarations in the suits.
122. Id. at 240.
123. Id. at 241. An additional reason pertains to the negotiable instrument: at
the time of its making the defendant recognized the value of the consideration.
124. 50 App. Div. 101, 63 N.Y.S. 372 (1900). The facts are, however, matched in
this respect by those of Strider v. Lewey, 176 N.C. 448, 97 S.E. 398 (1918), another
case of the seduced woman as plaintiff but coming under North Carolina's special
exception, discussed at infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
125. 50 App. Div. at 102, 63 N.Y.S. at 373.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 108, 63 N.Y.S. at 377.
128. Id.
129. 98 Minn. 475, 108 N.W. 483 (1906).
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her for support. The defendant was the son of the family for
whom she worked as a servant. Included in his repertoire of se-
ductive devices were threats of dismissal from employment. When
the young woman became pregnant, the defendant left, returning
after five years to be greeted with her seduction suit. The Minne-
sota court noted both the statutory exceptions and the Connecticut
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Richards, but nevertheless
affirmed the summary dismissal of the young woman's suit.130
It is noteworthy that the courts in both of the true exception
cases-Smith v. Richards and Graham v. Wallace-took pains to
describe their decisions in terms of possible causes of action other
than seduction. In Smith v. Richards it was fraud and deceit;131 in
Graham v. Wallace it was breach of duty under guardianship
law.132
Although not many such cases reached the appellate level, in
most of those that did, courts had little difficulty in rejecting the
suit of the seduced woman. As the emphasis shifted from the eco-
nomic loss of services to the moral offense, however, the reason
for barring the woman's suit also changed. No longer was she the
servant whose services were lost rather than the one deprived of
the services;1 33 now she was barred because she had consented to
the act.'3 4 Being in pari delicto, she was precluded by the doc-
trine of volenti non fit injuria.135
We do not pretend that this makes sense; quite the contrary.
As the tort developed, actual seduction became a prerequisite: the
woman had to have "been induced to consent to unlawful sexual
relations by persuasion and the promise to marry," to be "deceived
130. Id.
131. 29 Conn. 232, 241 (1860).
132. 50 App. Div. at 103-09, 63 N.Y.S. at 374-77. The theme of using other tort
actions in an action by the seduced woman was taken up explicitly by the Florida
Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 187 So. 620 (1939). For the
seduced woman to succeed as plaintiff, the court said, there would have to be some
independent "tortious trespass" upon her. As she had not alleged "undue influ-
ence, force, duress or other overpowering influence or dominating or fiduciary con-
trol over her by the defendant, and there [was] no direct allegation that the
defendant promised to marry the plaintiff," she failed in her seduction action. 136
Fla. at 697, 187 So. at 623-24.
133. E.g., Roper v. Clay, 18 Mo. 383 (1853).
134. E.g., Hamilton v. Lomax, 26 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (Barb.) 615, 617 (1858) ("[She can-
not] maintain an action for such seduction, because the person seduced assents
thereto.") See also Colly v. Thomas, 99 Misc. 158, 163 N.Y.S. 432 (1917); Hutchins v.
Day, 269 N.C. 607, 153 S.E.2d 132 (1967); Oberlin v. Upson, 84 Ohio St. 111, 95 N.E.
511 (1911).
135. "One who consents cannot receive an injury." See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, 136
Fla. at 689, 187 So. at 620; Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71 (1807); Hamilton, 26 N.Y. Sup.
Ct. at 615; Hutchins v. Day, 269 N.C. 607, 153 S.E.2d 132 (1967); Colly, 99 Misc. at
158, 163 N.Y.S. at 432.
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by arts and blandishments, corrupted and drawn aside from the
right path."136 In other words, the seduction may have involved
consent, but under diminished responsibility or incapacity induced
by seductive artifices.137 Actual, willing consent was thus a de-
fense. How then could this diminished consent bar the woman
from suing in her own right? Clearly, judges were struggling to
find a way to justify a decision fitting the cause of action as it had
come down to them in the precedents. Now, however, the original
rationale no longer applied.13s So long as one did not have to jux-
tapose the contradictory elements in the same opinion, expediency
was effective, at least for a reasonable time.
This brings us to the first of the psuedo-exceptions to the
general rule that a woman could not sue for her own seduction:
actions involving statutory rape. If the seduced woman was, at the
time of the seduction, under the legislatively determined permissi-
ble age,13 9 she was, by statute, incapable of consenting to sexual in-
tercourse. Under the new fiction that she was barred as a plaintiff
in seduction because of her consent, a woman legally incapable of
consent had to be excepted. Thus, where the seduction was statu-
tory rape, a jury verdict in favor of the seduced woman could be
upheld.140
The most interesting group of psuedo-exceptions comes from
North Carolina. North Carolina judges were well aware of the fic-
tional nature of the historical basis of the tort of seduction. The
father's right to sue for loss of services was "a figment of the law,
136. Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Clemons v.
Sheba, 131 Mo. App. 378, 379, 111 S.W. 522, 523 (1908); State v. Wheeler, 108 Mo.
658, 662, 18 S.W. 924, 925 (1892)). See also Hutchins v. Day, 269 N.C. 607, 153 S.E.2d
132 (1967).
137. It thus became a significant question whether a seduction action would lie
in a case of rape-where there is no consent at all. Courts answered in the affirma-
tive: Monahan v. Clemons, 212 Ky. 504, 279 S.W. 974 (1926); Kennedy v. Shea, 110
Mass. 147 (1872); Dalman v. Koning, 54 Mich. 320, 20 N.W. 61 (1884). One would
have thought that it would take considerable chutzpa to defend and appeal on this
ground, but there are a number of such cases reported.
138. Thus in both the true exceptions, Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232 (1860)
(fraud and deceit), and Graham v. Wallace, 50 App. Div. 101, 63 N.Y.S. 372 (1900)
(breach of duty under guardianship law), rather than meet the problem head on
the courts struggled to find theories other than seduction on which to base the ap-
propriate holding.
139. In Colly v. Thomas, 99 Misc. 158, 163 N.Y.S. 432 (1917), the applicable stat-
ute, N.Y. Penal Law § 2010 (Consol. 1909), made sexual intercourse with a woman
under the age of 18 "rape in the second degree."
140. E.g., Colly, 99 Misc. at 158, 163 N.Y.S. at 432; Huempfner v. Bailly, 36 S.D.
533, 156 N.W. 78 (1916) (a case in which the causes of action for seduction and
breach of promise of marriage get thoroughly confused); Robinson v. Moore, 408
S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (Texas allows the rape victim a civil remedy).
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to open to him the door for the redress of his injury,"'14 but was,
nevertheless, "the substratum, on which the action is built. The
actual damage, which he has sustained . . . exists only in the hu-
manity of the law, which seeks to vindicate his outraged feelings.
He comes into the court as a master-he goes before the jury as a
father."142 Later, however, the 1868 North Carolina Constitution
provided that "feigned issues" should be abolished;143 this was re-
inforced by legislation providing that "an action should be brought
by the real party in interest." 144
When in 1892 Ellen Hood sued her seducer145-the son of her
employer-for damages resulting from her pregnancy and "sorrow
and distress upon herself and her family,"146 she found the North
Carolina Supreme Court ready to recognize the contradictions in-
herent in the prevailing theory and to implement these constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. Of the theory that the woman's
suit was barred by her consent, Justice Clark wrote that "consent
procured by fraud is not consent." 47 The cause should, and hence-
forth in North Carolina would, "rest on the true issue of damages
for the wrong done."'148 Accordingly, "it should be beyond contro-
versy that where an action is for seduction of a woman of full age,
she, and not the father, is the proper one to bring the action."149
This would have been a fine and sensible decision if decided purely
under common law, but it is notable that it took a constitutional
provision reinforced by a general statute to wrench the judiciary
away from the force of precedent, however irrational. Hood v.
Sudderth became the law in North Carolina15O and was extended
to a minor woman in 1918.151
141. Briggs v. Evans, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 16, 20 (1844). Even earlier, in McClure v.
Miller, 11 N.C. (4 Hawks) 133, 137 (1825) (Taylor, C.J.), that the father was the in-
jured party was called "one of the quaintest fictions in the world."
142. Briggs, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) at 20.
143. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1.
144. 1 N.C. Code, ch. 10, tit. 4, § 177 (1883).
145. Hood v. Sudderth, 111 N.C. 215, 16 S.E. 397 (1892).
146. Id. at 216, 16 S.E. at 398.
147. Id. at 219-20, 16 S.E. at 399.
148. Id. at 219, 16 S.E. at 399.
149. Id.
150. E.g., Tillotson v. Currin, 176 N.C. 479, 97 S.E. 395 (1918); Hyatt v. McCoy,
194 N.C. 25, 138 S.E. 405 (1927).
151. Strider v. Lewey, 176 N.C. 448, 97 S.E. 398 (1918). Plaintiff was a remarka-
bly naive child; defendant was her recently widowed grandfather, with whom she
had lived and slept since she was an infant. In addition to claiming that the minor
woman plaintiff had no right to sue, the defendant also argued her equal criminal-
ity in incest, a defense avoided by diminished responsibility. The court's outrage is
shown by its description that defendant "took advantage of her youth and inexperi-
ence and, with wicked and diabolical design upon her innocence and virtue, induced
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While other states have similar constitutional and statutory
provisions, it was not until 1974152 and 1977153 that other courts
made similar use of them. 154 The Michigan Supreme Court in
1883155 found a right of action in the seduced woman implied in
the statutes156 eliminating services and allowing her to authorize a
relative to sue on her behalf. This, however, was really a statutory
rather than a judicial innovation and will be discussed below.157
Two other cases that are sometimes cited as exceptions, Doe
v. Horn 158 and Comer v. Taylor,I59 are really the result of the con-
fusion of seduction with breach of promise to marry. As more
states by statute permitted the seduced woman to sue,160 and as
her to submit to his wishes and have sexual intercourse with him." Id. at 449, 97
S.E. at 398-99.
152. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974). The provision was art.
I, § 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution: "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy
in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property,
or character." In extending the cause of action to the seduced woman, the court
added a limitation: "A woman may recover damages for her seduction where the
act or acts of seduction are induced by false or fraudulent representations." 62 Wis.
2d at 312, 215 N.W.2d at 18-19.
153. Piggott v. Miller, 557 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. App. 1977) (used Missouri's "real
party in interest" statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 507.010 (1969)).
154. The Florida Supreme Court declined to use constitutional and statutory
provisions in Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 187 So. 620 (1939).
155. Watson v. Watson, 49 Mich. 540, 14 N.W. 489 (1883).
156. Mich. Comp. Laws, tit. 30, ch. 194, §§ 6195-97 (1872).
157. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
158. Doe on the Demise of Hutchinson v. Horn, 1 Ind. 363 (1849). This was actu-
ally an ejectment action. Jourdan had arrived in Indiana, apparently a bachelor,
married Matilda Beard, set up a farm, and had two children. He still, however, had
a wife in Virginia. Ten years later a creditor obtained a judgment against him; in
order to avoid losing his land, Jourdan told Matilda of his prior marriage, assigned
the land to her, and disappeared. Matilda knew nothing of the creditor. The ques-
tion, therefore, was whether "the deceit and injury he had inflicted upon her"
counted as consideration for the assignment. Id. at 364. The court held that it did,
but in so doing approved, among others, the jury instruction: "[T]he seduction of an
innocent woman, under such circumstances as were disclosed in the present case,
entitles the injured party to a compensation in money, and will be deemed in law a
valuable consideration for a grant." Id. at 365. Matilda and Horn, her new hus-
band, kept the land and this strange case became an "exception" to the general rule
barring the seduced woman from suing.
159. 82 Mo. 341 (1884). The father sued for seduction, seduction under promise
of marriage, and scandal and infamy; he was awarded damages for all three. The
Missouri Supreme Court reversed, saying he had only one cause of action-seduc-
tion. Regarding the second count, "seduction accomplished under a breach of
promise of marriage," the court said: "For such breach of contract the woman
alone could maintain action." Id at 344. Thus the Missouri court rejected the po-
tential double recovery that Chief Justice Wilmot had contemplated with such
equanimity in Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769). This was a
breach of promise to marry, not a seduction decision.
160. By 1890 Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, North Dakota, and Oregon all had such statutes; see infra notes 209-36 and
accompanying text.
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the occasional judicial exception appeared, courts began to confuse
these distinct actions.161 In actions for breach of promise to marry
(in which the woman herself had long been the proper plaintiff),
damage awards for seduction 162 became more frequent during the
latter part of the nineteenth century. 6 3 This is, perhaps, the
source of the common but erroneous conflation of seduction to se-
duction under breach of promise to marry.164 The two causes of
action-seduction and breach of promise-were distinct.
It took until 1977 for a common law court, the Missouri Court
of Appeals, to take issue directly with the traditional rule banning
suit by the seduced woman.165 The plaintiff was a thirty-year-old
divorced woman who was seduced and embezzled under promise of
marriage. Chief Judge Simeone, in writing a veritable treatise on
the tort, noted the paucity of precedential cases in Missouri (eight-
een) and the length of time since the last case (fifty years).166
The facts were such as would sway the heart of any normal
person, and so it was with the court, but it faced two problems:
how could a divorced mother of an eight-year-old daughter be pre-
viously chaste? Also, could the woman herself sue? The question
of the chastity of a divorced woman had been addressed and re-
solved by many other courts. Chastity is not the same as virginity;
a woman may "fall" but subsequently reform so as once more to be
the potential victim of the seducer's wiles.167 "Seduction presup-
poses chastity, but it would not do to hold that chastity once lost
can never be regained."'168
In addressing the question of the woman's right to sue, Chief
161. In earlier cases the promise to marry was, like other seductive artifices,
inadmissible as irrelevant. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
162. For example, in Lichliter v. Russell, 89 Ill. App. 62, 63 (App. Ct. 1899), the
Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the woman based on breach of
promise of marriage "aggravated by seduction."
163. Grossberg, supra note 103, at 45-49 (1985). Professor Grossberg shows
clearly the connection of this development in law and the changing conception of
the moral role of women.
164. E.g., Boedges v. Dinges, 428 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
165. Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). In a 1968 case confusing
seduction and breach of promise actions brought by the seduced woman and both
her parents, the same court with little discussion upheld an award of $400 to the
parents for medical expenses and $12,500 to the woman for the breach and perhaps,
for the seduction. Boedges, 428 S.W.2d at 930.
166. The last reported case was Owens v. Fanning, 205 S.W. 69 (Mo. Ct. App.
1918). Chief Judge Simeone notes in Breece v. Jett the possible exception of Boedges
v. Dinges. Breece, 556 S.W.2d at 707.
167. E.g., Fulgham v. Gatfield, 72 Idaho 367, 241 P.2d 824 (1952); Kralick v. Shut-
tleworth, 49 Idaho 424, 289 P. 74 (1930); Haeissig v. Decker, 139 Minn. 422, 166 N.W.
1085 (1918); Breon v. Hinkle, 14 Or. 494, 13 P. 289 (1887).
168. Haeissig, 139 Minn. at 423, 166 N.W. at 1085. "[Tlhe law gives her an oppor-
tunity to repent and reform." Id.
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Judge Simeone first provided a history of the tort and the reason
for barring the woman's suit-namely, her consent to the "illicit
intercourse." 169 He dealt with the basis in services as fictional, but
did not address the contradiction in the newer justification of con-
sent. Rather, he based the extension of the cause to the seduced
woman on precedents developed in other jurisdictions for special
circumstances:T7 0
If it were alleged that the defendant committed a tortious tres-
pass upon her person in which she was not particeps criminis
or in pari delicto and there was undue influence, force, duress,
overpowering influence or a dominating fiduciary control over
her or where there was a promise of marriage, the woman
could maintain the action for seduction in her own name. 17 1
These are just the factors necessary to turn ordinary consensual
intercourse into tortious seduction, so the extension of the cause of
action to the seduced woman is clearly general. This is a long way
from the early cases treating the woman only as a servant and re-
quiring proof of services. It was, however, a very long time in com-
ing, and perhaps, as Chief Judge Simeone himself suggests,172
arrived only at a time more suitable for the final extinction of the
tort.173
Apart from this extension of the right of action to the se-
duced woman, little else changed in the common law tort of seduc-
tion from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. It became
commonplace to account for damages as exemplary or punitive,174
and to allow evidence of defendant's wealth so that the jury might
determine the appropriate amount of damages.'7 5 Emotional dis-
tress, suffering, and loss of honor displaced loss of services as the
169. Breece, 556 S.W.2d at 705.
170. Id. The precedents used are those discussed above and perhaps Bowman v.
Hart, 161 Tenn. 402, 33 S.W.2d 58 (1930), a case falling squarely under the long-
standing Tennessee statute (Tenn. Code § 4501 (1896), modeled on Ala. Code § 2133
(1852)), giving the seduced woman the right to sue. These statutes scarcely support
the more liberal development in this case.
171. 556 S.W.2d at 705 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 187 So. 620
(1939)). The sources of the last part of this language are Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71
(1807), a case confusing seduction and breach of promise, as well as the statutory
rape case of Colly v. Thomas, 99 Misc. 158, 163 N.Y.S. 432 (1917).
172. 556 S.W.2d at 707-08.
173. Chief Judge Simeone's opinion was adopted within six weeks in Piggott v.
Miller, 557 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), although the court in that case bolstered
the position with an argument under Missouri's "real party in interest" statute, Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 507.010 (1969).
174. E.g., Graham v. Smith, 46 Tenn. App. 549, 330 S.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1959)
($20,000 held not to be an excessive award); Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612, 9 N.W.
599 (1881).
175. E.g., Lavery, 52 Wis. at 612, 9 N.W. at 599; Marshall v. Taylor, 98 Cal. 55, 56,
32 P. 867, 868 (1893) ($25,000 award sustained where defendant was a married "man
of mature years, [and] large property interests").
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significant aspect of damages, 7 6 with a high of $25,000 being
reached in the 1915 South Dakota case, Eller v. Lord.177 As proof
of seduction in the moral sense became relevant, evidence of
promises of marriage, importunings of love, and other sundry se-
ductive devices became the rule rather than the exception,17 8 and
were even held to be an essential part of the plaintiff's case.1 79
Two state supreme courts, those of Illinois and Massachu-
setts, have greatly limited the availability of seduction as a cause of
action. In both states, the decisions involved statutes peripheral to
seduction. In 1947, Illinois adopted legislation limiting recovery in
alienation of affections, breach of promise, and criminal conversa-
tion actions to actual damages, barring consideration of such fac-
tors as the defendant's wealth or injury to the plaintiff's
feelings. 180 Although seduction was not explicitly abolished or
limited by this legislation, the preamble indicates a preference for
the criminal law, rather than tort law, for seduction actions.18 '
The preamble merely states policy, not law. As the statute ex-
pressly limits the other heart balm actions, it appears that the abo-
lition of civil seduction was not intended. Yet in Smith v. Hill,182
the Illinois Supreme Court held that a woman cannot bring a
cause of action for her own seduction, and that seduction was
merely evidence of aggravation of damages in actions for breach of
contract to marry.18 3 Thus the Supreme Court of Illinois so en-
176. E.g., Haeissig v. Decker, 139 Minn. 422, 166 N.W. 1085 (1918); Dwire v.
Stearns, 44 N.D. 199, 172 N.W. 69 (1919).
177. 36 S.D. 377, 154 N.W. 816 (1915) (the 15-year-old daughter's personality
changed and she now wanted liquor, cigarettes, and the like).
178. In most 20th century cases this hitherto inadmissible evidence was a part of
the case.
179. E.g., Seamons v. Spackman, 81 Idaho 361, 341 P.2d 442 (1959); Breece v. Jett,
556 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
180. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, §§ 1901-1907 & 1954-1957 ch. 89, §§ 25-33 (Smith-Hurd
1980).
181. The preamble states:
It is hereby declared as the public policy of the state that the best in-
terests of the people of the state will be served by limiting the dam-
ages recoverable in such actions, and by leaving any punishments of
wrongdoers guilty of seduction to proceedings under the criminal laws
of the state, rather than to the imposition of punitive, exemplary, vin-
dictive or aggravated damages in actions for breach of promise or
agreement to marry.
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 1801 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
182. 12 Ill. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958).
183. Smith v. Hill involved a suit for breach of promise to marry, as well as for
seduction, and challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The court upheld the
statute and denied aggravated damages. There was a detailed dissent. 12 Ill. 2d at
598, 147 N.E.2d at 877. In Siegall v. Solomon, 19 Ill. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960), the
court also upheld the constitutionality of the 1947 Act as applied to an alienation of
affections action.
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twined seduction with the other heart balm actions that it could no
longer stand alone as a tort action, despite the fact that seduction
had previously been an independent common law cause of action
in Illinois.184
In 1938, Massachusetts enacted legislation abolishing the
cause of action for breach of promise to marry.1 85 This legislation
was attacked in Thibault v. Lalumiere,18 6 in which the court held
that an action for seduction cannot be maintained independent of
an action for breach of promise for marriage.18 7 Since the 1938
legislation had abolished causes of action for breach of contract to
marry, it followed that no action for seduction was available.18 8
Thus, as in Illinois, the Massachusetts court moved from seduction
as an independent tort to seduction as a mere aggravation of dam-
ages, although in neither state did a statute explicitly limit
seduction. 8 9
In the last twenty-five years, there has been little significant
appellate action in the common law jurisdictions. Seduction, in its
classical form, was held to be a valid cause of action in Penn-
sylvania in 1960, and the plaintiff was given twenty days to amend
his complaint to allege the loss of his daughter's services.190 In
1962, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff on a statute of limitations question.1 91 The Texas Court
of Appeals reiterated the traditional parties requirement in 1966,
but as the plaintiff was below the statutory age and thus incapable
of consent at the time of seduction, she was permitted to pro-
ceed.192 In 1967, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that
the plaintiff had failed to prove that the "intercourse [was] in-
duced by deception, enticement or other artifice" and affirmed the
184. Mighell v. Stone, 175 Ill. 261, 51 N.E. 906 (1898).
185. 1938 Mass. Acts ch. 350, § 1 (codified at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 47A
(Michie/Law Co-op. 1981).
186. 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945).
187. The court had an ancient Massachusetts oddity, Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71
(1807), for support.
188. 318 Mass. at 75, 60 N.E.2d at 351. In DeCicco v. Barker, 339 Mass. 457, 159
N.E. 2d 534 (1959), however, the court, in allowing a suit to recover engagement
rings, questioned the broad language in Thibault and noted that "the statement was
too inclusive." Id. at 459, 159 N.E.2d at 535.
189. Should a suitable case arise, however, these opinions could easily be distin-
guished, allowing the courts to entertain seduction actions, much as the New Jersey
court boldly found a judicial exception to a statute clearly abolishing seduction ac-
tions in Blackman v. lies, 4 N.J. 82, 71 A.2d 633 (1950).
190. Whiteman v. Sarmento, 10 Ches. Co. Rep. 27, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 384 (Pa.
Comm. P1. 1960).
191. Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1962).
192. Robinson v. Moore, 408 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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trial court's nonsuiting of her seduction claim. 193
The Missouri courts have entertained no less than four appel-
late cases in this period. The first, Boedges v. Dinges,194 was a
breach of promise action, with seduction possibly exacerbating
damages. In 1977, two court of appeals panels permitted actions by
the seduced woman, the first195 on common law principles alone,
the second 96 bolstering the argument with Missouri's "real party
in interest" statute.197 Finally, in 1980, the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals found Massachusetts law applied and that Massachusetts had
abolished the cause of action. 198
Slawek v. Stroh,199 a 1974 Wisconsin case, was a declaratory
judgment action by a young man seeking to have his rights as a fa-
ther determined; the defendant mother counterclaimed in seduc-
tion. The court held that the Wisconsin Constitution required her,
as the real party in interest, to be a permissible party plaintiff.
200
The most recent common law seduction case was in 1980 in North
Carolina where the court again found that the plaintiff had failed
to prove "deception, enticement, or other artifice." 20 ' Six of the
jurisdictions in which the common law cause of action survives
have had appeals of seduction cases since 1960.202 Thirteen have
not.
2 0 3
Despite its anachronistic flavor, the common law cause of ac-
tion for seduction thus survives today unaffected by legislative or
judicial abolition in nineteen jurisdictions.204 In Breece v. Jett,
Chief Judge Simeone summed up the modern form of the tort as
follows:
1. The action in this, unlike other states, is based upon the
common law and is not a statutory action;
193. Hutchins v. Day, 269 N.C. 607, 609, 153 S.E.2d 132, 134 (1967).
194. 428 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
195. Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
196. Piggott v. Miller, 557 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
197. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 507.010 (1969).
198. Greco v. Anderson, 615 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
199. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
200. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
201. McCraney v. Flanagan, 47 N.C. 498, 499, 267 S.E.2d 404, 405 (N.C. Ct. App.
1980).
202. Arizona, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. See
supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
203. Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and the District
of Columbia.
204. Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the District of Co-
lumbia. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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2. Today, unlike the common law, the woman, whether a mi-
nor or an adult, may maintain the action in her own name pro-
vided that she is unmarried at the time of the seduction - she
may be a divorced woman;
3. The conduct of the defendant must consist of solicitations,
importunities, misrepresentations, knowingly false promises or
artifices, including a false promise to marry for the purpose of
seduction, which lead the plaintiff, a chaste unmarried woman,
to deviate from the path of rectitude;
4. The deviation must occur because of the false solicitations,
importunities, false promises or false promise to marry;
5. The plaintiff, having a right to rely upon the artifices or
false promises, relied upon such promises or artifices;
6. Relying on such false promises or artifices, the plaintiff
consented to unlawful sexual intercourse; and
7. The action is a species of fraud and the evidence to support
a judgment must be clear, cogent and convincing.2 05
His account may be unduly optimistic in assuming the total demise
of the old paternalistic form of the action,20 6 and it is probably in-
correct to add the modifier "unlawful" in paragraph 6, there being,
among adults, few non-forceable acts that count as "unlawful sex-
ual intercourse." Otherwise, his account is substantially accurate.
II. Legislative Modifications of the Common Law
There have been three great periods of legislative reform in
the field of heart balm actions. In the second half of the nine-
teenth century, many states enacted statutes specifically addressed
to seduction, and in the 1930s and 1970s, there were waves of legis-
lation abolishing heart balm actions.20 7 By 1983,208 fifteen states
had legislatively abolished or limited seduction as a cause of action,
and six more had abolished the remaining three heart balm actions
without expressly touching seduction. The first part of this section
examines the legislation promoting the cause of action for seduc-
tion, while the second section examines legislation abolishing or
limiting it. The latter section concludes with a survey of judicial
decisions under state statutes in the last twenty-five years, and a
summary of the present state of legislative impact on the tort.
205. 556 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
206. See, e.g., Robinson v. Moore, 408 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) ("The
Courts of this State seem committed to the rule that a seduced female may not
maintain a civil action against her seducer for the seduction alone.")
207. Some of these statutes addressed only criminal conversation, alienation of
affections, and breach of promise of marriage, and not seduction.
208. The most recent abolition was North Dakota's in 1983; Act of April 14, 1983,
ch. 172, § 9, 1983 N.D. Laws 441, 445-46 (codified at N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-06
(Supp. 1985)).
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A. Legislation Liberalizing Seduction Actions
Between 1846 and 1913, some nineteen states or territories
enacted statutes liberating seduction from its common law limita-
tions.209 During this period, there were only two statutes that ex-
pressly recognized the tort without modifying it,210 and no
legislation abolished it. The legislation follows a predictable pat-
tern, coincident with the development of the common law concep-
tion of the tort. Recognizing that the wrong was essentially one of
morals and honor, and not of the economics of service, the statutes
abolished the requirement of alleging or proving services, and ex-
tended the right of action to the real party in interest-the se-
duced woman.21 '
Michigan was first, in 1846, with a complicated statute elimi-
nating the loss of services as an element of the cause of action.2 12
The class of permissible plaintiffs was stated as the seduced wo-
man's "father, mother, or guardian" for a minor, but then ex-
tended in a unique way: "and if such female be of full age, the
action may be brought by her father or any other relative who
shall be authorized by her to bring the same."213 The point of this
extension is explained in the 1883 case, Watson v. Watson.2 14 The
successful plaintiff was the seduced woman, and that was one of
the grounds of appeal.215 The court said of Michigan's seduction
statute: "These several provisions point unmistakably and clearly
209. Alabama-Ala. Code pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2133 (1852); Alaska-Comp. Laws
of the Territory of Alaska tit. XIII, ch. 3, § 864 (1913); California-Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 375 (1872); Georgia-Ga. Code § 2951 (1861); Idaho-Rev. Stat. of Idaho Ter-
ritory § 4097, 4098 (1887); Indiana-Ind. Rev. Stat. pt. 2, ch. 1, §§ 24, 25 (1852);
Iowa-Iowa Code tit. 19, ch. 100, §§ 1696, 1697 (1851); Kentucky-Ky. Gen. Stat. ch.
1, § 2 (1873); Michigan-Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 6195-97 (1872); Mississippi-Miss.
Rev. Code §§ 1508, 1509 (1880); Montana-Mont. Civ. Code §§ 11, 12 (1877); Ne-
vada-Nev. Rev. Laws §§ 4994, 4995 (1912); Oregon-Or. Codes & Gen. Laws tit.
III, ch. 1, §§ 35, 36 (1892); South Dakota-S.D. Rev. Code §§ 2976-2977 (1919); Ten-
nessee-Tenn. Code §§ 2801, 2802 (1858); Utah-Utah Comp. Laws tit. I, §§ 231, 232
(1888); Virginia-Va. Code tit. 44, ch. 148, § 1 (1849); Washington-Wash. Code
§§ 10, 11 (1881); West Virginia-W. Va. Code ch. 148, § 1 (1860).
210. Md. Code ch. 122, art. 75, § 28(30) (1888); N.D. Civ. Code § 1973 (1877).
211. Five states, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Virginia, and West Virginia, elim-
inated services from the cause of action but did not extend it to the seduced wo-
man; only one state, Alabama, extended it to the seduced woman without
mentioning services. Thirteen states, Alaska, California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Washing-
ton, did both. See supra notes 209-10.
212. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 6195 (1876). Sections 6196 and 6197 elaborate on
pleadings and ensure that the common law theory is not abrogated.
213. Id. § 6195.
214. 49 Mich. 540, 14 N.W. 489 (1883).
215. She had, until her majority, lived in defendant's household as "his adopted
daughter, although not in fact formally adopted." 49 Mich. at 541, 14 N.W. at 489.
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to the conclusion that the design and intention was to give the per-
son seduced the right to recover damages for the injury she had
sustained and thus do away with the unjust rule that prevailed at
common law."216 Why, then, did the legislature not say so ex-
pressly? Until 1861, Michigan rules of evidence prohibited a plain-
tiff from testifying; thus, to make the seduced woman the plaintiff
in a seduction action would be self-defeating.217 Allowing her to
authorize another to sue on her behalf avoided this dilemma.
Once the rules of evidence changed, the implication of legislative
intent could be given effect, and the court did so.
Virginia's 1849 statute eliminating services from the cause of
action was a model of brevity, simply stating that "allegation or
proof of the loss of the service of the female" was unnecessary. 218
West Virginia in 1869,219 and Kentucky in 1873,220 followed Vir-
ginia's model; in 1861, Georgia adopted more complicated language,
but of similar effect.221 These five were the only states to elimi-
nate the services requirement without giving a right of action to
the seduced woman.
Alabama, in 1852, was the only state to give the cause of ac-
tion to the woman without mentioning services. The statute pro-
vided: "An unmarried female may prosecute as plaintiff an action
for her own seduction, and may recover such damages as may be
assessed in her favor."222 This straightforward language became a
model for other states.223
The dominant pattern throughout this period was to enact
both provisions: the extension of the right of action to the seduced
woman and the abolition of the requirement that some services be
proven lost. As noted, Alabama's language was the model for ex-
tending the cause of action to the seduced woman. Iowa, in 1851,
the first state to enact both provisions, set the pattern for the elim-
216. Id, at 544, 14 N.W. at 490.
217. Id. at 545, 14 N.W. at 491.
218. Va. Code tit. 44, ch. 148, § 1 (1849): "An action for seduction may be main-
tained without any allegation or proof of the loss of the service of the female, by
reason of the defendant's wrongful act."
219. W. Va. Code ch. 103, § 1 (1869).
220. The language has insignificant variations on Virginia's: "An action for se-
duction may be maintained without any allegation or proof of the loss of service of
the female, by reason of the wrongful act of the defendant." Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 1,
§ 2 (1873).
221. Ga. Code § 2951 (1861).
222. Ala. Code pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2133 (1852).
223. Indiana and Tennessee used the same language, with Indiana referring to
Alabama's statute as the source. Alaska, Oregon, and Washington modified it by
requiring the woman to be 21. California, Idaho, Montana, and Utah inserted "pe-
cuniary or exemplary" after "damages." Nevada followed California but required
the woman to be under 21.
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ination of services: "The father, mother, or guardian, as the case
may be, may also bring suit for the seduction of a minor daughter
or ward though such daughter or ward be not living with nor in
the service of the plaintiff and though there be no loss of ser-
vice."224 One significant variation on this language is the omission
of the restriction to minor women. Of the eighteen jurisdictions
abolishing services as an element of the cause of action, only
seven 225 restricted the statute to minors.226 In those seven states,
the classical common law theory would probably survive where
the seduced woman was over the age of majority, but since all
seven also extended the right of action to the woman, there is no
case law to bear this out.
Nevada was unique in its legislation extending the right of ac-
tion to the seduced woman. It was the only state to limit the age
of seduced women plaintiffs to under twenty-one. One might
guess that the consistent intent, even then, was to abolish the
cause of action for women aged twenty-one or over. However,
there has never been a reported appellate decision in Nevada to
support or refute this speculation.
There were minor variations more explicitly specifying the
proper plaintiff,2 2 7 and barring actions by one of the possible plain-
tiffs where suit had already been brought by another.228 Iowa had
a unique addendum providing that "where the action is brought by
the guardian the damages recovered shall enure to the sole benefit
of the ward."229 Twelve jurisdictions also added provisions for
such damages as the jury might award,230 and seven expressly con-
224. Iowa Code tit. 19, ch. 100, § 1697 (1851); see also Ind. Rev. Stat. pt 2, ch. 1,
§ 25 (1852); Miss. Rev. Code § 1509 (1880).
225. Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and Utah.
226. More recently, California in 1939 and Washington in 1973 amended their
statutes by inserting such a limitation. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying
text.
227. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 375 (1872): "A father, or in the case of his death or
desertion of his family, the mother, may prosecute as plaintiff for the seduction of
the daughter, and the guardian for the seduction of the ward .... " This pattern is
followed in other jurisdictions: Comp. Laws of the Territory of Alaska tit. XIII, ch.
3, § 864 (1913); Rev. Stat. of Idaho Territory § 4098 (1887); Mont. Civ. Code § 12
(1877); Nev. Rev. Laws § 4995 (1912); Or. Codes & Gen. Laws tit. III, ch. 1, § 35
(1892); Utah Comp. Laws tit. I, § 232 (1888); Wash. Code § 11 (1881). Tenn. Code
§ 4502 (1896) provided for the "father or widowed or deserted mother" to be plain-
tiff, and S.D. Rev. Code § 2976 (1919) provided that the "father, mother, sisters,
brothers and any person in loco parentis may maintain an action against the se-
ducer. "
228. Alaska, California, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington. See supra notes 209, 227.
229. Iowa Code § 1697 (1851).
230. Alabama, Alaska, California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, Ore-
gon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington. See supra note 209.
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templated exemplary damages. 23 1
The jurisdictions modifying the requirements for a seduction
action in these ways were all recognizing the lack of rationality in
the common law cause of action. By legislation, they brought the
cause of action into line with its actual, social basis. They provided
for the true victim to be the plaintiff, for the recognition of the
morality that makes seduction tortious, and for damages in accord
with this reality. That so many legislatures took such actions ac-
cords with the constant trend toward morality in the opinions of
common law judges and the awards of juries. The changes in soci-
etal mores that brought about such a shift in emphasis at that time
are the subject of section three, below. It is, for the present, note-
worthy that after Alaska's 1913 statute, there was no further new
legislation in favor of seduction as a tort. This legislation was, es-
sentially, a late nineteenth-century phenomenon.
The impact of this legislation can be seen in the illustrative
Iowa case of Gover v. Dill,232 decided a mere five years after the
enactment of Iowa's statute. The plaintiff was the seduced woman,
and she alleged no pregnancy or other incapacity: the claim was
for the loss of virtue. The court held that she had to show not just
the fact of intercourse, but that the defendant induced her so to
join him "by some promise or artifice .... by his flattery or decep-
tion." 233 Her willingness to take part would be a defense, as would
her prior lack of chastity (or as the court put it, "that she had pre-
viously prostituted herself to the embraces of other men"2 34).
Although the plaintiff had not affirmatively proven her prior vir-
ginity, her claim to have been unmarried was left unchallenged,
and thus she had the benefit of the presumption, also unchal-
lenged, that an unmarried woman is chaste. The tone is highly
moralistic throughout. For example, the court quoted with ap-
proval a jury instruction that "the person seduced must have been
previously of chaste character-that she yet preserved that price-
less jewel that is the peculiar badge of the virtuous unmarried fe-
male."235 Virtue itself, not services, was the valuable at stake.236
231. California, Georgia, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota and Utah. See
supra note 209.
232. 3 Iowa 337 (1856).
233. Id. at 340.
234. Id. at 342.
235. Id. at 343 (emphasis in original).
236. The plaintiff asked for damages of $5,000; the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court, although the opinion does not say how much the jury awarded. Id.
at 337-43.
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B. Legislation Abolishing the Tort of Seduction
In 1935 a national movement began in Indiana, resulting
within the year in the enactment of statutes in seven jurisdictions
that abolished, or severely limited, causes of action for seduction,
alienation of affections, breach of promise to marry, and criminal
conversation.237 Three more states passed similar legislation in
the next five years, 238 and Florida followed in 1945.239 Many more
states introduced anti-heart balm statutes in 1935 but failed to pass
them.240
There was very little activity at the appellate level in the tort
of seduction in the years prior to this revolution. For example, in
New York from 1901 to 1935 there were only five appellate deci-
sions, the most recent being in 1917.241 Indiana courts had heard
only two seduction appeals in the same period, the most recent be-
ing in 1931.242
The statutes abolishing heart balm actions were usually intro-
237. Alabama-Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No. 356, 1935 Ala. Acts 780 (presently codi-
fied at Ala. Code § 6-5-331 (1975)); Illinois-Heart Balm Act, 1935 Ill. Laws 716
(codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 246.1-.6 (1937)) (found unconstitutional under
the Illinois Constitution in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946), re-
enacted in revised form, Acts of July 18, 1947, 1947 Ill. Laws 796-801; Act of July 8,
1947, 1947 Ill. Laws 1181, and presently codified at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, §§ 1801-
1810, 1901-1907 & 1951-1957 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1986)); Indiana-Heart Balm
Act, ch. 208, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009 (presently codified at Ind. Code § 34-4-4-1 (1982));
Michigan-Act of June 3, 1935, No. 127, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201 (presently codi-
fied at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2901 (1968)); New Jersey-Act of June 27,
1935, ch. 279, 1935 N.J. Laws 896 (presently codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:23-1 to
2A:23-6 (1952)); New York-Act of Mar. 29, 1935, ch. 263, 1935 N.Y. Laws 732 (re-
pealed by Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 308, § 10001), 1962 N.Y. Laws 1297, 1549 (presently
codified at N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 10,001 (McKinney 1981)), re-enacted in revised
form by Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 310, § 65, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1650, 1677 (presently codi-
fied at N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 80-a to 84 (McKinney 1976)); Pennsylvania-Act of
June 22, 1935, No. 189, 1935 Pa. Laws 450 (presently codified at Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
48, §§ 170-177 (Purdon 1965)).
238. California-Act of May 10, 1939, ch. 129, §§ 1-4, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1245 (pres-
ently codified at Cal. Civ. Code §§ 49 (West 1982)); Colorado-Act of Apr. 27, 1937,
ch. 111, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 403 (presently codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-20-201
to 13-20-208 (1974)) (note that §§ 13-20-202 and 13-20-203 were amended in 1979);
and Massachusetts-Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 350, 1938 Mass. Acts 326 (presently
codified at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 47A (Michie/Law Co-op. 1981) (abolishing
only breach of contract to marry)).
239. Act of June 11, 1945, ch. 23,138, No. 624, 1945 Fla. Law 1342 (presently codi-
fied at Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 771.01-.08 (West 1964)).
240. Feinsinger, supra note 2, at 997-98. Feinsinger lists Arizona, Connecticut,
Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin (14 states!). He missed Ohio.
See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
241. Colly v. Thomas, 99 Misc. 158, 163 N.Y.S. 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917).
242. Burke v. Middlesworth, 92 Ind. App. 394, 174 N.E. 432 (1930).
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duced as bills to promote public morals. Preambles typically con-
tained language such as this:
To promote public morals, by abolishing civil causes of
action for breach of promise to marry, alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, and certain causes of action for seduc-
tion .... 243
[Heart balm actions] have been subjected to grave
abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humilia-
tion and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent
and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely victims of cir-
cumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by un-
scrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment .... 244
The legislation was typically introduced and supported by wo-
men. Indiana's pioneering bill was introduced by Roberta West
Nicholson, at the time Indiana's only woman legislator.45 Repub-
lican Blanche E. Hower and Democrat Alma Smith246 virtually
raced to introduce similar legislation in Ohio.247
These early "heart balm" (or, sometimes, "anti-heart balm")
statutes followed three patterns. Four states-Colorado, Florida,
New Jersey, and New York-completely abolished all four causes
of action. The standard text was: "The rights of action heretofore
existing to recover sums of money as damage for the alienation of
affections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of contract
to marry are hereby abolished."248 Four states-Alabama, Califor-
nia, Indiana, and Michigan-abolished alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, and breach of promise to marry, and abol-
ished seduction only for women above a specified age.249 Indiana's
243. This preamble language is found in Colorado (1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 403,
403) and Indiana (1935 Ind. Acts 1009, 1009) law.
244. This preamble language comes from Florida law (1945 Fla. Law 1342, 1342);
similar language was used by New York (1935 N.Y. Laws 732, 733) and New Jersey
(1935 N.J. Laws 896, 896).
245. She was the Democratic Representative from Marion, Indiana. The 1935
session was the third in which she introduced the bill; her campaign for the legisla-
tion began in 1931.
246. Indianapolis Star, Feb. 3, 1935, at 6, col. 4.; id., Feb. 6, 1935, at 1, col. 7. Ms.
Hower prevailed.
247. Ohio did not, however, enact the legislation until 1978. See Act of Mar. 8,
1978, 137 Ohio Laws 2225 (presently codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29
(Page 1981)).
248. Florida, New Jersey, and New York used this language. See Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 771 (West 1964); 1935 N.J. Laws 896, 896; 1935 N.Y. Laws 732, 732. Colorado's ver-
sion was: "All civil causes of action for breach of promise to marry, alienation of
affections, criminal conversation and seduction are hereby abolished." 1937 Colo.
Sess. Laws 403, 403.
249. In Alabama the age was 21 years or over (Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No. 356, 1935
Ala. Acts 780), but it has since been lowered to 19 (Ala. Code § 6-5-331 (1975)). Cal-
ifornia used "under the age of legal consent," Cal. Civ. Code § 49 (West 1982); Indi-
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language was typical: "[A]ll civil causes of action for breach of
promise to marry, for alienation of affections, for criminal conver-
sation, and for the seduction of any female person of the age of
twenty-one years or more are hereby abolished... ,"250 Of the re-
maining three states that enacted legislation in this pioneer period,
two-Illinois and Pennsylvania-abolished actions for breach of
promise to marry, alienation of affections, and criminal conversa-
tion, but left seduction untouched. 251 The Illinois Supreme Court
subsequently found in this legislation an implied abolition of se-
duction.252 Massachusetts abolished only the cause of action for
breach of contract to marry, but this of itself was found to imply
the abolition of seduction.253 The Illinois statute was unique in
that it was a criminal statute prohibiting any person, including one
acting as attorney, to file or threaten to file an action in alienation
of affections, criminal conversation, or breach of contract to
marry. 2 54
Clearly, the tort of seduction was not the primary target of
this anti-heart balm legislation.255 It is significant, however, that
only with respect to seduction is there any variation in the effect
of the statutes. Legislatures thus must have been paying special
attention to seduction while working on the overall anti-heart
balm program. Why this should be so, and why there should have
been such a wave of legislation at that time, is addressed in section
three, below.
All these early anti-heart balm statutes, except that of Illi-
aria "the age of twenty-one years or more," Heart Balm Act, ch. 208, 1935 Ind. Acts
1009, 1009; and Michigan "the age of eighteen years or more," Act of June 3, 1935,
No. 127, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201, 201.
250. Heart Balm Act, ch. 208, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009, 1009. Alabama and Michigan
used almost identical language, changing only the age. See Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No.
356, 1935 Ala. Acts 780; Act of June 3, 1935, No. 127, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201, 201.
California simply amended its previous statute liberalizing the cause of action. Cal.
Civ. Pro. Code §§ 374, 375 (West 1954), repealed by Act of Aug. 17, 1967, ch. 1231,
1967 Cal. Stat. 2998. It also amended its statement of personal rights, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 49 (West 1982), by inserting the age limit and added a stylistic variant of Indiana's
language to Cal. Civ. Code § 43.5 (West 1982).
251. 1935 Ill. Laws 716; 1935 Pa. Laws 450; see supra note 237.
252. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
254. Heart Balm Act, 1935 111. Laws 716, 716: "It shall be unlawful for any per-
son, either as litigant or attorney, to file, cause to be filed, threaten to file, or
threaten to cause to be filed, in any court in this State, any pleading or paper set-
ting forth or seeking to recover upon any civil cause of action based upon alienation
of affections, criminal conversation, or breach of contract to marry .... " (effective
May 4, 1935).
255. See Note, Abolition of Actions for Breach of Promise, Alienation of Affec-
tions, Criminal Conversation and Seduction, 5 Brooklyn L. Rev. 196 (1936).
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nois, survived constitutional challenge in the courts.2 56 The Illi-
nois statute was a criminal one entitled "An act in relation to
certain causes of action conducive to extortion and blackmail
.... ,,257 The caption did not specifically mention the three actions
prohibited by the statute; the text of the statute failed to mention
blackmail or extortion. However, the Illinois Constitution of 1870
required that the title of the statute reflect the contents.258 Thus,
in Heck v. Schupp,259 an alienation of affections action, the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down the statute in its entirety. In addition,
the Illinois Constitution of 1870 required that there be "a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs." 260 Not only did
the statute violate this provision, it "tend[ed] to put a premium on
the violation of moral law, making those who violate the law a
privileged class, free to pursue a course of conduct without fear of
punishment even to the extent of a suit for damages." 26 1 Clearly,
the moral conscience of the court had been offended. In the fol-
lowing year, 1947, the Illinois legislature enacted three new stat-
utes, not abolishing heart balm actions, but limiting recovery to
actual damages without consideration of such factors as the de-
fendant's wealth or injury to the plaintiff's feelings. Again, seduc-
tion was not mentioned. 262
New Jersey's 1935 anti-heart balm statute met with quite dif-
ferent treatment in the state's supreme court. In the 1950 case,
Blackman v. les,263 the court held, despite the clear language of
the statute,264 that it did not prohibit an action by a parent for loss
256. See Goldberg v. Musim, 162 Colo. 461, 427 P.2d 698 (1967); Pennington v.
Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E.2d 619 (1937); Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5
N.E.2d 815 (1936), appeal dismissed, 301 U.S. 667 (1937); Hanfgarn v. Mark, 248
App. Div. 325, 289 N.Y.S. 143 (1936), appeal dismissed, 272 N.Y. 671, 5 N.E.2d 386
(1936), aff'd, 249 App. Div. 776, 292 N.Y.S. 1012 (1936) (statute unconstitutional),
rev'd, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47 (1937), remittitur amended, 274 N.Y. 570, 10 N.E.2d
556 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641 (1937) (statute constitutional); see Note,
"Heart Balm" Legislation and the Constitution, 1 Wyo. L.J. 75 (1947).
257. Heart Balm Act, 1935 Ill. Laws 716, 716 (codified at Ill. Rev. Stats. ch. 38,
§ 246 (1937)).
258. Ill. Const. of 1870, art. IV, § 13, states "No act... shall embrace more than
one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
259. 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
260. Ill. Const. of 1870, art. II, § 19.
261. 394 Ill. at 299-300, 68 N.E.2d at 466.
262. Act of July 18, 1947, 1947 Ill. Laws 796-801, 1181, and presently codified at
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, §§ 1801-1810, 1901-1910, & 1951-1960 (Smith-Hurd 1980 and
Supp. 1986).
263. 4 N.J. 82, 71 A.2d 633 (1950).
264. See supra note 248 for the New Jersey statute. Since 1926, New Jersey has
had a statute-presently N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:1-1 (West 1976)-providing that the
parents of a child have a cause of action for "the loss of the wages or services of
their minor child" as a result of deliberate or negligent injury, but not specifically
mentioning seduction.
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of services due to seduction. New Jersey's is the only state
supreme court to have created such an exception in the face of a
statutory abolition.265 Six years later, the exception was limited in
Magierowski v. Buckley, 266 where the language of the statute was
held to apply when the seduced woman was not a minor.
The final wave of legislation abolishing or limiting heart
balm actions began in 1972.267 By 1983, nine more states had en-
acted such statutes.268 The forms the legislation took were very
similar to those of the previous period. Five states-Delaware,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming-completely
abolished all four heart balm actions.269 Two states-Ohio and
Oklahoma-abolished all heart balm actions but with specific ex-
ceptions for minor or incompetent victims of seduction, 270 and for
alienation of affections.271 The other two states--Georgia and Ore-
gon-abolished actions for alienation of affections, criminal con-
versation, and breach of promise, but not seduction. The language
265. See Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of Anti-Heartbalm Statutes, 52 Colum.
L. Rev. 242, 252-53 (1952).
266. 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (1956).
267. In the interim, Wisconsin in 1959 abolished actions for breach of promise to
marry, but not for seduction. Act of Oct. 28, 1959, ch. 595, § 73, 1959 Wis. Laws 740,
765 (presently codified at Wis. Stat. Ann. § 768.01 (West 1981). That Wisconsin still
recognizes seduction as a tort is clear from its statute providing for arrest of per-
sons likely to flee the jurisdiction pending certain civil actions, specifically includ-
ing seduction. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 818.02(1)(a) (West Supp. 1985).
268. Delaware-Act of July 5, 1972, ch. 489, 58 Del. Laws 1601 (presently codified
at Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (1975)); Georgia-Act of Apr. 4, 1979, No. 86, § 46,
1979 Ga. Laws 466, 496-97 (presently codified at Ga. Code, § 51-1-17 (1982); see also
Ga. Code § 51-1-16 (1982)); Minnesota-Act of Mar. 23, 1978, ch. 515, 1978 Minn.
Laws 141 (presently codified at Minn. Stat. Ann. § 553.01-.03 (West Supp. 1985));
North Dakota-Act of Apr. 14, 1983, ch. 172, § 9, 1983 N.D. Laws 441, 445-46 (pres-
ently codified at N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-06 (Supp. 1985)); Ohio-Act of Mar. 8,
1978, 137 Ohio Laws 2225 (presently codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29
(Page 1981)); Oklahoma-Act of May 31, 1976, ch. 164, 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws 230
(presently codified at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1987)); Oregon-Act
of July 2, 1975, ch. 562, 1975 Or. Laws 1285 (presently codified at Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 30.840, 30.850 (1983)); Virginia-Act of Apr. 1, 1977, § 2, ch. 617, 1977 Va. Acts
1052, 1083 (presently codified at Va. Code § 8.01-220 (1984)); and Wyoming-Act of
Mar. 10, 1977, § 1, ch. 24, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 771, 871-72 (presently codified at
Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-23-101 to 1-23-104 (1977)).
269. Delaware, Minnesota, North Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming. See supra
note 267.
270. Ohio law provides that "no person shall be liable in civil damages for any
breach of promise to marry, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation, and
no person shall be liable in civil damages for seduction of any person eighteen years
of age or older who is not incompetent." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29 (Page
1981).
271. Oklahoma has this exception for both seduction and alienation of affections:
"IT]he alienation of the affections of a spouse of sound mind and legal age or seduc-
tion of any person of sound mind and legal age is hereby abolished as a civil cause
of action in this state." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1987).
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used was, with the exception of Oklahoma's, the same as, or stylis-
tic variations on, that of the 1930s legislation.
Two states-Alaska and Washington-that had previously en-
acted statutes liberalizing the cause of action, enacted amendments
to inhibit severely future use of seduction as a cause of action.2 2
Both states had abolished the element of services that had been re-
quired in classical seduction actions, Washington generally, and
Alaska for minors. In 1973, Washington amended this provision by
substituting "child" for "daughter," thus making it both gender
neutral and age restrictive.273 Both states had also provided for
the seduced woman to be the plaintiff. Both repealed these provi-
sions, Washington in 1973274 and Alaska in 1974.275 The effect
should be a return to classical seduction law, except for minor wo-
men where loss of services is not an element of the cause of action.
Thus, a seduction action might still be possible for the parent of an
adult woman if loss of services were shown. Under common law
principles, the courts might still be free to extend the right of ac-
tion to the seduced woman herself, as did the Missouri Court of
Appeals.276 In the face of this history of legislation, however, it is
unlikely that such actions would succeed. The legislative intent
seems to have been to abolish the cause of action except in the spe-
cific circumstances contemplated by the surviving statutes.
Louisiana is unique as a civil law jurisdiction in the United
States. It does not have a provision in its code directly addressing
seduction, but has had two related cases, Brunet v. Deshotels and
Manuel v. Deshotels.277 Both actions were brought under a provi-
sion making parents responsible for the wrongful acts of their chil-
dren.278 The court in Brunet held that the mother of the seduced
woman had a cause of action against the alleged seducer and his
father.279
272. See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
273. Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 154, § 5, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1118, 1125
(amending Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.020 (1963)).
274. Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 154, § 121, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1118, 1197-
1198 (repealing Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.030 (1962)).
275. Act of May 17, 1974, ch. 127, § 64, 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 127, p. 1, 12
(repealing Alaska Stat. § 09.15.030).
276. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
277. Brunet v. Deshotels, 160 La. 285, 107 So. 11 (1926); Manuel v. Deshotels, 160
La. 652, 107 So. 478 (1926).
278. La. Civ. Code Art. 2318 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
279. Brunet, 160 La. at 285, 107 So. at 111. Although these are the only seduction
cases reported in Louisiana, there is another heart balm opinion of historical inter-
est: In 1850 the judge remarked in a breach of promise action that "[s]uch suits are
not infrequently the mere instruments of extortion .... " Morgan v. Yarborough, 5
La. Ann. 316, 323 (1850); this judge wrote this some 80 years before such opinions
became popular.
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In the last twenty-five years, there have been only three se-
duction actions appealed in states where the tort is governed by
statute. Surprisingly, these cases have been in New York and Cali-
fornia, states that have abolished the cause of action. In the two
New York cases, the statute was held to bar the cause of action. 28 0
A California case in 1983281 upheld the statutory bar on seduction
actions by adult women, but was resolved on a fraud rather than a
seduction theory. No cases have been reported since 1960 in any of
the other eighteen states in which seduction is still a viable cause
of action for at least minor women.
A summary of the present state of the tort in states with stat-
utory modifications of common law seduction is as follows. Nine
states-Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming-have abolished the
cause of action. Notwithstanding the statute, the supreme court of
New Jersey has found that the cause of action is still available to
the parents of minor seduced women. Six states-Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Oklahoma-have abolished
the cause of action for women over the age of majority (or consent
in the case of California). Of these, Ohio and Oklahoma also re-
quire that the woman be mentally competent for the abolition to
hold. In twelve states-Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Utah-the seduced woman is permitted to sue as plaintiff. In Ne-
vada only minor women, in Oregon only adult women, and in Cali-
fornia only women over the age of consent have the right of action.
Of course, in those states that have abolished the tort for adult wo-
men, only minors will qualify as plaintiffs. Sixteen states-Alaska,
California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washing-
ton, and West Virginia-have abolished the element of services in
classical seduction actions. In Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Ne-
vada, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington this is restricted to minor
women, and in California to women below the age of consent.
Maryland still has in effect its statute recognizing the common law
tort. Louisiana has its civil code, which has been interpreted so as
to acknowledge actions for damages resulting from seduction.28 2
280. Aadland v. Flynn, 27 Misc. 2d 833, 211 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1961) was brought by
an actress against the estate of the late Errol Flynn. The court made several dis-
paraging remarks on the suit in dismissing it. See also Rappel v. Rappel, 39 Misc.
2d 222, 240 N.Y.S.2d 692, aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 850, 247 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1963).
281. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App.
1983).
282. See supra notes 209-81 and accompanying text.
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III. The Ideal Woman and the Tort of Seduction
Seduction as a cause of action has changed a great deal over
the last three hundred years, as the first and second sections show.
In this section, this article will examine possible explanations of
the steps in that evolutionary development. The thesis advanced is
that changes in the social conception of women and women's roles
brought about changes in the tort of seduction. Alternative expla-
nations of the development of the tort are also examined.
Prior to the development of the basic modern concept of the
tort of seduction,283 there prevailed a social conception of men
having property rights in women very closely tied to sexual rela-
tions. For example, in the statutes of the sixth-century Kentish
king Aethelberht, it was provided that "[i]f [one] freeman lies with
the wife of [another] freeman, he shall pay [the husband] his wer-
geld [compensation], and procure a second wife with his own
money, and bring her to the other man's home."28 4 Apparently,
intercourse with the other so destroyed her nuptial value as to re-
quire the! wife's replacement.28 5 Such facts led historian Keith
Thomas to the hypothesis that "fundamentally, female chastity has
been seen as a matter of property; not, however, the property of
legitimate heirs, but the property of men in women ..... [T]he
value of this property is immeasurably diminished if the woman at
any time has sexual relations with anyone other than her hus-
band."286 This explanation certainly fits feudal data through at
least the fourteenth century case of Lincoln v. Simond.28 7 "The
absolute property of the woman's chastity was vested not in the
woman herself, but in her parents or husband. And it might be
sold by them." 28 8 "[G]irls who have lost their 'honor' have also
lost their saleability in the marriage market."28 9
This "property" basis seems to have become more economic
283. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
284. The Laws of the Earliest English Kings 9 (F.L. Attenborough ed. 1922) (The
Laws of Aethelberht, § 31).
285. The laws also provide for substantial compensation (on par with that for a
killing) for intercourse with "a maiden belonging to" another man, but does not
mention daughters specifically. Id. at 5, 7 & 15 (Aethelberht, §§ 10, 14, 16, & 82).
286. Keith Thomas, The Double Standard, 20 J. Hist. Ideas 195, 209-10 (1959).
287. K.B. 27/519, m.63 (Coram Rege roll, Hilary 1391), reprinted in Arnold,
supra note 13, at 213.
288. Thomas, supra note 286, at 213.
289. Id. at 210. This conception has not yet disappeared from the western world:
in 1978 a court in Athens, Greece, awarded the parents of seduced 16-year-old
350,000 drachmae (about 9,000 U.S. dollars at the time) in damages "in order to
compensate a man of her own economic and social standing for the loss of her vir-
ginity." The Times (London), Jan. 21, 1978, at 4, col 5.
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and less sexual in later years.290 In the statutes of Henry V11291
and Elizabeth 1,292 abduction, but only of an heiress, was held
criminal. There seems to have been no thought given to the idea
of a cause of action in the seduced woman herself, she having no
legal identity separate from her father or guardian.29 3 When it
was realized that there was value in the services of a daughter and
cost in the loss thereof through pregnancy, the cause of action
arose again, under the established writ of per quod servitium
amisit. This development does not fit Thomas's concept of prop-
erty in the woman's chastity, that being irrelevant to the cause of
action,294 but it is in accord with the more general hypothesis of
men's property in women. As Thomas later notes, "[t]he virtue of
women was relative to their function and their function was to ca-
ter to the needs of men."295 By the mid-seventeenth century, a fa-
ther who no longer held his daughter's virginity as a marketable
commodity still had a valuable interest in her services.
So far, Thomas's explanation based on fathers (and, after
marriage, husbands) having property rights in women fits the his-
torical data well.296 However, Thomas himself asks (but does not
answer) whether this merely pushes the explanatory burden back
a step.297 Why should chastity be of economic value? This article
proposes that the prevailing conception of women and their role
provides the appropriate source of explanation.
It is clear that in England through the end of the eighteenth
century women were regarded as valuable and marketable prop-
erty. In 1797, the London Times reported:
The increasing value of the fair sex is esteemed by several em-
inent writers as the certain criterion of increasing civilization.
SMITHFIELD [a market particularly reputed for its sales of
290. "In feudal society there was always somebody with a financial interest in
every woman's marriage ..., but when this situation disappeared it was only the
chastity of women with property which continued to be legally protected, because
the loss in the case of landless women was nobody's but their own." Thomas, supra
note 285, at 212. As this article was going to press, Professor Backhouse published
an article on the law of seduction in 19th century Canada making an argument sim-
ilar to Thomas's. See Constance Backhouse, The Tort of Seduction: Fathers and
Daughters in Nineteenth Century Canada, 10 Dalhousie L.J. 45 (1986). Unfortu-
nately, Backhouse's publication came too late to be treated more fully here.
291. 3 Hen. 7, ch. 2.
292. 39 Eliz., ch. 9. See 8 William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law
427 (1925).
293. See Blackstone, supra note 20.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
295. Thomas, supra note 286, at 213.
296. It is argued below that Thomas's account is inadequate as an explanation of
the legislative developments in 19th century United States. See infra note 317 and
accompanying text.
297. Thomas, supra note 286, at 210.
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women] has, on this ground, strong pretensions to refined im-
provement, as the price of Wives has risen in that market from
half a guinea, to three guineas and a half.298
That this property interest had, at that time, little to do with chas-
tity can be seen from the not uncommon practice of selling
wives. 2 9 9 To own a woman was to own her services, a useful as
well as valuable asset. 300 The common law form of the cause of
action seems quite appropriate when women are thus conceived.
Seduction, in the common law form in which the tort first ap-
peared in the United States,301 can be seen as economically based
because the value of women was economic. In a pioneering society
it was essential that every member work, a necessity that was rein-
forced by a puritan ethic that regarded idleness as sinful. Women,
both single and married, were expected to, and generally did, pro-
vide a wide variety of essential productive services. 30 2 The concept
of the ideal woman was the "perfect wife," a woman who, as well
as being a mother, provided all the goods and services necessary to
the maintenance of the male-headed household.303 In this pioneer
society, however, women were also in relatively short supply, espe-
cially in frontier areas. "This (from the point of view of women)
favorable sex ratio enhanced their status and position." 30 4 Women,
both single and married, were more valued and were accorded
more social freedom in the United States than in England at that
time.30 5 It is, therefore, not surprising that United States judges
were quite forthright in their approach to the irrationality of the
cause of action's being for loss of services alone,306 and in permit-
ting a more general basis for damages. 3 0 7 Where women were in
short supply, an unmarried woman's value must have exceeded
that of her mere productive potential. Nor would this seem to be
298. The Times (London), July 22, 1797, at 2, col. 3.
299. See Viola Klein, Feminine Character 7-8 (1946).
300. Id. at 8-10.
301. See supra notes 58-103 and accompanying text.
302. See generally Elisabeth A. Dexter, Colonial Women of Affairs (1931); Elisa-
beth A. Dexter, Career Women of America: 1776-1840 (1950); Gerda Lerner, The
Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age of Jackson, 10
Midcontinent Am. Stud. J. 5 (1969). At the beginning of the 19th century there was
no clothing or food canning or even shoemaking industry in the United States and
these functions were typically part of the woman's role, even in wealthier
households.
303. Suffer and be Still: Women in The Victorian Age at ix (Martha Vicinus ed.
1972) [hereinafter Vicinus].
304. Lerner, supra note 302, at 5.
305. See id. at 5-6; Jane Louise Mesick, The English Traveller in America: 1785-
1835, at 88-99 (1922).
306. See, e.g., McLure v. Miller, 11 N.C. (4 Hawks) 133 (1825).
307. See, e.g., Stout v. Prall, 1 N.J.L. 93, 1 Coxe 76 (1791). See generally supra
notes 58-103 and accompanying text.
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dependent on the woman's virginity, but it would be seriously dis-
rupted by pregnancy. Thus, the English common law tort, requir-
ing a showing of loss of services-and hence, normally, of
pregnancy-but permitting damages to be determined indepen-
dently of services actually lost, suited the needs of the new United
States society reasonably well.
The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of in-
dustrialization and rapid economic development in the United
States. With this development came a change in social organiza-
tion, with mobility and status based on ability rather than inheri-
tance, at least for men.308 It was also a period that led to the first
statutory revisions of the tort of seduction.30 9 The changes in so-
cial organization and the changes in the tort of seduction are re-
lated. Professor Bigelow, writing at the turn of the century,310
attributes the statutory liberalization of seduction law to the
change in class structure, and in particular to the rise of the mid-
dle class:
The [common] law was the expression of that earlier social era
when the children of the children of people of the working
class were the servants of the head of the family; the working
class did not make the law,-they were not strong enough,-
and those who did make it considered it enough to protect the
head of the family from loss of service .... The higher classes
would not be apt to call upon the law; it was better to hush the
matter up. But when, in the nineteenth century, the middle
class appeared, it was a matter of social pressure that the old
view should be modified.31 1
While there must be a great deal of truth in this explanation, it is,
on its own, insufficient. 312 Why should the rise of the middle class
to numerical and political prominence bring about such social pres-
sure and with it a change in this tort? The answer lies in the
change in the conception of woman and her appropriate (or ideal)
role that came with the economic and social developments.
As Lerner writes: "The period 1800-1840 is one in which deci-
308. Lerner, supra note 302, at 6.
309. See supra notes 209-36 and accompanying text. The legislation began with
Michigan in 1846 and by Alaska's enactment in 1913, some 19 states or territories
had reformed the tort in one or both of two ways: first by eliminating allegation or
proof of loss of services as a requirement; second by extending the right of action to
the seduced woman.
310. Melville Madison Bigelow, The Law of Torts 267-68 (8th ed. 1907).
311. Id. at 267-68 (emphasis in original). Bigelow notes, correctly, that the stat-
utes were enacted in "newer States especially."
312. Class structure-and changes in it-fails also to account for the legislation
of the 1930s and 1970s abolishing the tort. Bigelow cannot, of course, be held ac-
countable for this failing, but the explanation can.
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sive changes occurred in the status of American women." 313 By
midcentury, the image of the ideal woman had changed from the
hard working, capable wife to the delicate, leisured creature hav-
ing "little connection with any functional and responsible role in
society." 314 "The attributes of True Womanhood, by which a wo-
man judged herself and was judged by her husband, her neighbors
and society could be divided into four cardinal virtues-piety, pu-
rity, submissiveness and domesticity." 315 This was also an era of
extreme prudery in sexual propaganda,316 at least among wo-
men,317 and the attitude toward sex of the "ideal woman" of the
time has been aptly characterized as "passionlessness." 318 Women
were considered constitutionally unfit for intellectual effort 319 or
the rough and tumble of the working or business worlds.320 As
James Fenimore Cooper wrote, the ideal woman "[r]etired within
the sacred precincts of her own abode . . . preserved from the de-
stroying taint of excessive intercourse with the world."32 1
It should be emphasized, as it is by all writers on the subject,
that the realization of this conception of the ideal woman was very
much confined to the middle class. Poor women were, as before,
313. Lerner, supra note 302, at 5.
314. Vicinus, supra note 303, at ix.
315. Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 Am. Q. 151,
152 (1966). This oft-cited article is a fascinating documentation of the morality pre-
vailing in the popular magazines and books of the period.
316. "American society from the 1830s to the 1860s was marked ... by uncom-
promising and morally relentless reform movements." Carroll Smith-Rosenberg,
Beauty, the Beast, and the Militant Woman, 23 Am. Q. 562, 563 (1971); see also Wel-
ter, supra note 315.
317. The double standard continued with great vigor-see generally Thomas,
supra note 286-as is shown by the prevalence of prostitution: estimates of the
number of prostitutes in New York in the 1830s went as high as 20,000; Cincinnati
had 7,000 for a population of 200,000 and Philadelphia 12,000, for a population of
700,000 in 1869. Reay Tannahill, Sex in History 357 (1980). This double standard
and profligate male behaviour were attacked by reformist women's organizations.
Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 316.
318. Nancy F. Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ide-
ology, 1790-1850, 4 Signs 219 (1978). Vicinus takes the title of her anthology on wo-
men in the Victorian age, see supra note 303, from Sarah Stickney Ellis's famous
line that a woman's "highest duty is so often to suffer and be still." Sarah Stickney
Ellis, The Daughters of England 73 (1845).
319. "The female brain and nervous system, male physicians and educators
agreed, were inadequate to sustained intellectual effort." Smith-Rosenberg, supra
note 316, at 563.
320. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg & Charles Rosenberg, The Female Animal: Medi-
cal and Biological Views of Woman and Her Role in Nineteenth-Century America,
60 J. Am. Hist. 332 (1973).
321. 1 James Ferfimore Cooper, Notions of the Americans 140 (1828). No paral-
lel morality was imposed on or expected of men. Tannahill, supra note 317, at 355-
56. Prostitution was endemic, the usual estimate being one prostitute for every 12
men between the ages of 15 and 60. Id. at 356.
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working on farms, in factories, and as menials. On the other hand,
there were, of course, feminist reformers.322 But women such as
Mary Wollstonecraft, Frances Wright, and Harriet Martineau
"were condemned in the strongest possible language-they were
read out of the sex. 'They are only semi-women, mental
hermaphrodites.' "323 It was the middle-class morality, however,
that set the influential standards of the time. As Bigelow points
out, it was middle-class social pressure that brought about the leg-
islative changes in the tort of seduction.324 Nor does it matter that
reality only rarely matched the ideal. It was the stereotype, the
myth rather than the reality, that set the course of that middle-
class social pressure.325
For the middle-class woman, there was little opportunity in
the economic sphere. The development of the clothing industry
took away one of her primary productive functions.326 Profession-
alization of many occupations previously open to women tended to
make them exclusively male.327 The tremendous increase in the
use of household servants took away much of the domestic la-
bor.3 28 Apart from factory work, the preserve of the lower-class
322. "It is all bosh and nonsense for men to continue the delusion that to intro-
duce women into politics is to debase her." Tennie C. Claflin, Constitutional Equal-
ity, A Right of Woman; Or a Consideration of the Various Relations Which She
Sustains as a Necessary Part of the Body of Society and Humanity; With Her Du-
ties to Herself-together with a Review of the Constitution of the United States,
Showing that the Right to Vote is Guaranteed to All Citizens. Also a Review of the
Rights of Children 63 (1871).
323. Welter, supra note 315, at 173; see also id. at 166, where Welter quotes a re-
view in 22 Am. Q. Rev. 38 (1837) of Harriet Martineau's Society in America (1837)
as "the bold ravings of the hard-featured of their own sex [reading which will] un-
settle [American women] for their true station and pursuits, and they will throw
the world back again into confusion"!
324. See supra notes 310-311 and accompanying text.
325. Patricia Branca, Image and Reality: The Myth of the Idle Victorian Wo-
man, in Clio's Consciousness Raised 179, 179-80 (Mary S. Hartman & Lois Banner
eds. 1974). "Throughout the Victorian period the perfect lady as an ideal of femi-
ninity was tenacious and all-pervasive, in spite of its distance from the objective sit-
uations of countless women." Vicinus, supra note 303, at x. It would be very useful
to compare illegitimacy data with the number of seduction actions (rather than re-
ported appeals) for different periods, but unfortunately 19th century data on either
is unavailable. Even early in the 20th century, illegitimacy rates were impossible to
obtain in some areas. Emma 0. Lundberg & Katharine F. Lenroot, Illegitimacy as
a Child-Welfare Problem, pt. 1, at 20 (1920) (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau
Publication No. 66).
326. Lerner, supra note 302, at 11.
327. Lerner, supra note 302; Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 316. The professional-
ization of medicine and midwifery in particular offers the most striking example.
In colonial times many women were practicing physicians and midwifery was a fe-
male monopoly; by the mid 19th century women had been completely excluded
from both. Lerner, supra note 302, at 6-9.
328. Tannahill, supra note 317, at 350.
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woman, and teaching, 329 there was very little for the middle-class
woman to aspire to but the role of dutiful and supportive wife. A
woman's primary function was to consume, conspicuously, the
household's wealth-to put into evidence her husband's ability to
pay. 330
In such a society, the consequences to a single woman of an
untimely pregnancy were far worse than the economic problems of
single parenthood in less bigoted times. The literature of the time
told of such young women not only suffering social humiliation,
but wasting away physically, and even dying.331 Typically, their
babies were also sickly or dying.332 Even without pregnancy, pre-
marital intercourse would lead inexorably to depravity and de-
cay.33 3 "[T]o be guilty of such a crime, in the women's magazines
at least, brought madness or death."334 The ideological message is
clear: "The woman who broke the family circle ... threatened so-
ciety's very fabric."335
The common law of the tort of seduction was quite out of ac-
cord with this social mythology. As the prevailing morality and
the state of the law became progressively more incongruent, it was
to be expected that the latter would adjust. Thus, the legislative
changes in the tort of seduction in the second half of the nine-
teenth century are not at all surprising. The new version of the
tort, divorcing it completely from services, fit the prevailing mid-
dle-class morality of that time. Allowing proof of prior unchastity
as a defense also fit this moral mythology: loss of innocence itself
was the harm. Similarly, permitting the seduced woman, now the
party most grievously injured, to sue fit the conception of women
in the prevailing morality. Women, although morally superior,
were also considered physically and intellectually inferior to men.
In seduction she was always the victim of man's base and lustful
appetites, never a willing participant.336 Thus, the legislative re-
329. A teacher shortage and the expansion of common education kept the role of
teacher open to women. Lerner, supra note 302, at 10. In the latter part of the
19th century the invention of the typewriter created a whole new profession that
quickly became a woman's preserve. As with most "woman's work" both these
trades are characterized by a lack of promotional prospects. Sheila M. Rothman,
Woman's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices, 1870 to the
Present 42-60 (1978).
330. See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic
Study of Institutions 80-85 (1899).
331. Welter, supra note 315, at 155-59.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 154.
335. Vicinus, supra note 303, at xiv.
336. The popular belief was that any woman, if only her duty would allow,
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form of the second half of the nineteenth century is an expectable
result of the tension between the moral ideology on the one hand,
and the morality and social organization underpinning the com-
mon law tort on the other.
Although the legislative changes are not surprising, the inac-
tion of the courts in those states that did not legislate is more diffi-
cult to explain. Some of the effects of the legislative changes were
achieved by reducing the requirement of services to be lost to a to-
ken, and changing the time of loss from that of the seduction to
that of the lying in and birth. Even a vestigial service require-
ment, however, still left the victim of seduction who suffered
neither pregnancy nor "loathsome disease" without a remedy. Yet
in the morality of the time, her loss was very great. Permitting
damage awards unrelated to services lost ameliorated, but could
not eliminate, this discrepancy. In the face of this dramatic up-
heaval in social patterns, one would have expected at least some
courts to have permitted suit by the victim herself. Such, however,
was not the case. The judges, more than the legislatures, remained
the captives of a prior, inapposite, cultural mythology.
Obviously the lot of women was not destined to remain in
this sorry state indefinitely. The movement begun at Seneca Falls
in 1848337 continued unabated, although for many years it faced an
uphill struggle, even among women.338 Societal factors also con-
spired to change the role of women. The latter part of the nine-
teenth century saw the development of plausible occupations for
middle-class single women. Typist, stenographer, 339 and depart-
ment store salesclerk 340 were added to the traditional female occu-
would engage less often in sexual intercourse. Smith-Rosenberg & Rosenberg,
supra note 320, at 347.
337. The Women's Rights Convention held at Seneca Falls, New York, July 19
and 20, 1848, is commonly considered the beginning of organized feminism in the
United States. The convention produced a pioneering statement of women's rights:
The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, reprinted in 1 History of Woman Suf-
frage 70-73 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda J. Gage eds.
1881), in Anne Fivor Scott & Andrew Mackay Scott, One Half the People: The
Fight for Woman Suffrage 56-59 (1975), and in The Feminist Papers 415-20 (Alice
S. Rossi ed. 1973).
338. See 4 History of Woman Suffrage at xxii (Susan B. Anthony & Ida Husted
Harper eds. 1902).
339. "In the 1870s, men typically worked as stenographers and scriveners; wo-
men composed less than 5 percent of this group. By 1900, the women held fully
three-quarters of these jobs." Rothman, supra note 329, at 48 (citing Mary Allison,
The Public Schools and Women in Office Service 6 (1914)). See generally id. at 48-
51.
340. This occupation tended to be filled more often by lower-class and immigrant
women than by middle-class women. Department stores were a post-Civil War de-
velopment that also revolutionized the purchasing habits of the middle-class wo-
man. See generally Rothman, supra note 329, at 52-56.
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pation of teacher. At the same time, the birthrate continued to
decline 34 1 and schooling for children increased both in availability
and in daily hours.342 Add to this the breakthroughs in domestic
technology, 343 and women previously tied to the hearth became
freer to pursue employment, or if better off, social goals in the
outside world.344
The development of women's education also had a significant
influence on women's role. Starting with Vassar in 1865,345 wo-
men's colleges, and later the great state colleges of the midwest,
began slowly to dispel the myth of women's intellectual inferi-
ority.346 The success of this effort in the early part of the twenti-
eth century was dramatic: by 1920, thirty-four percent of all
college alumni were women. 347 Yet even this did not precipitate a
total revision of the image of woman. Instead, the concept of the
professional mother developed. Motherhood was viewed as such
an important and difficult art as to require education and organiza-
tion, both domestic and public.348
The negative aspects of the image of women were gradually
softened so that by the 1920s "the college graduate had become the
model woman." 349 Yet the ideal of purity, piety, and moral superi-
ority of women did not have to change with these developments.
The 1870s saw the birth of the Women's Christian Temperance
Union,350 an organization aimed not so much at temperance but at
the prohibition of drinking, smoking, and prostitution, and at "re-
fining the whole moral climate of the nation and reforming the
character of the coarse and vulgar male." 351 The 1870s also saw
341. Scott & Scott, supra note 337, at 27.
342. Id.
343. Id. Rothman, supra note 329, at 14-18.
344. Scott & Scott, supra note 337, at 27-28; Ida Husted Harper, Would Woman
Suffrage Benefit the State, and Woman Herself?, 178 N. Am. Rev. 362, 365 (1904).
345. Rothman, supra note 329, at 26-27. Oberlin College had been admitting wo-
men since 1834 but without "the rights and privileges of the male students." Id. at
27 n.*.
346. See id. at 26-42.
347. Rudolph C. Blitz, Women in The Professions, 1870-1970, Monthly Lab. Rev.,
May 1974, at 38. This particular figure, although impressive, may be misleading.
Deaths during World War I must have accounted for a large number of male
alumni. Thus 34% of surviving alumni in 1920 was still not a very large number of
women.
348. Rothman, supra note 329, at 97-127.
349. Id. at 37.
350. The WCTU was founded in 1873 and by 1890 had 160,000 members. Roth-
man, supra note 329, at 67. Under the dynamic leadership of Frances Willard, it set
out to bring the values of the home-that is, feminine morality-into the extra-do-
mestic world. Id.
351. Tannahill, supra note 317, at 399.
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the first legislation prohibiting contraception. 352 Much of the revo-
lutionary potential of the educated woman was defused by the no-
tion of education for motherhood. 353
Nor did the suffragist movement argue against the angelic
image of women. On the contrary: "Women fought for suffrage in
order to bring their special qualities to the ballot box. Women de-
served the vote not because they were the same as men, but pre-
cisely because they were different."354 If politics were so base and
corrupt, then it was time women exposed and remedied that condi-
tion.355 Men, in their monopoly of political power, had not proved
so successful that the system did not need the elevation women
could bring to it.356 By the twentieth century, the themes of natu-
ral justice and equality that infuse the Seneca Falls Declaration 357
had been replaced by the moral superiority of women and a less
congenial argument based on the comparison of women with im-
migrants, "several millions of plantation negroes," and American
Indians.35 8 Far from requiring a change in the image of woman as
a superior moral being, suffragist arguments depended upon it. To
be sure, the prevailing social conception of woman was undergoing
a change, but not of the kind that required a revision of the tort of
seduction.
As noted, this discussion has been substantially confined to
middle-class conceptions of middle-class women. So too it was
with the suffragist movement. The movement finally succeeded
when it brought working-class women 35 9 into its ranks,360 but the
352. E.g., The Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982)) (prohibiting the use of the mails for articles, devices, drugs,
etc., for contraception or abortion or for any information pertaining thereto). See
Grossberg, supra note 103, at 175-78.
353. For an example of the writing of a prominent proponent of this view, see
Annie Nathan Meyer, Woman's Assumption of Sex Superiority, 178 N. Am. Rev.
103 (1904). Meyer was one of the founders of Barnard College; her reactionary
views prompted Ida Harper's lively rebuttal. See Harper, supra note 344.
354. Rothman, supra note 329, at 127.
355. Claflin, supra note 322, at 63-64.
356. Harper, supra note 344, at 372-74.
357. See supra note 337. For a comprehensive and subtle account of this process,
see Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, at
43-74 (1965).
358. Harper, supra note 344, at 366-67. The jingoism and racism of this argu-
ment was sometimes less than admirable. For example: "Those who fear the for-
eign and the colored vote should remember that there are more native-born women
in the United States than foreign-born men and women; more white women than
colored men and women." Id. at 373.
359. Organized labor had long supported woman suffrage, id. at 369-70, but it
was not until 1913 that working women spoke at the annual meeting of the Na-
tional American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). Rothman, supra note
329, at 131.
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middle-class morality, and the middle-class conception of women
as the guardian thereof, was not automatically changed by that vic-
tory. On the contrary, it took many years for significant changes
in woman's social place to occur. The immediate benefits of the
franchise were, predictably, in infant and maternal welfare, 361 ed-
ucation, and protection of women in the workplace.362 In other ar-
eas, the old myths remained in place. So too did the old law of
seduction.
Thus emancipation was not based on, nor did it generate the
kind of change in, the image of women that would require revision
of the law of seduction. Indeed, it took another fifteen years for
the next round of legislative reform of the tort to begin.363 In the
second half of the 1930s, ten states abolished or severely limited
the availability of civil seduction along with the other three heart
balm actions.364 It is this partial revolution that must now be
explained.
The movement to abolish heart balm actions, including seduc-
tion, began in Indiana in 1935 largely through the efforts of Indi-
ana's only woman legislator, Roberta West Nicholson.365 Her
campaign caught on quickly,3 6 6 and by the end of 1935, similar bills
had been introduced in the legislatures of some twenty-three
states.367 In many states the reform bills were introduced by wo-
men legislators.368 Newspapers of the time reported the measure
as largely a women's cause. For example, a United Press story
360. Rothman, supra note 329, at 127-32. No doubt this is correct ideologically,
but as a practical matter it was state victories (brought about by the strategy
designed by Carrie Chapman Catt) that forced previously opposed senators to
change their votes in 1918. Maud Wood Park, The Winning Plan, in National
American Woman Suffrage Association Victory: How Women Won It 121 (1940).
361. The Sheppard-Towner Act (also known as the "Maternity Hygiene Act"),
ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921), repealed by Act of Jan. 22, 1927, ch. 53, § 2, 44 Stat. 1024
(effective June 30, 1929).
362. See Rothman, supra note 329, at 135-53; William Henry Chafe, The Ameri-
can Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970, at 4-6
(1972).
363. See supra notes 237-81 and accompanying text.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 237-54.
365. See supra text accompanying note 245.
366. See Indianapolis Times, Mar. 23, 1935, at 2, col. 8, which carried the sub-
heading Mrs. Nicholson's Campaign Now Extends to 14 States of Union.
367. Bills were introduced in Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Feinsinger, supra note 2, at 997-98; see also
supra note 237.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 246-47 (Indiana & Ohio); Indianapolis
Times, Mar. 23, 1935, at 2, col. 8 (Maryland, introduced by the state's only woman
senator, Mary E.W. Risteau); and Feinsinger, supra note 2, at 997 (Nebraska).
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stated: "The loudest champions of the legislation are women while
the most bitter opponents are men."369 Support, however, came
from all segments of society,37 0 the legislation having generated
considerable interest.3 7 1
Enactment of anti-heart balm statutes began with Indiana's
statute being signed into law by Governor McNutt on March 12,
1935;372 those states that were to follow suit did so quickly. The
New York Act, patterned after Indiana's, became law on March 29,
followed by Michigan (June 3), Pennsylvania (June 22), New
369. Indianapolis Times, Mar. 23, 1935, at 2, col. 8.
370. "A flood of mail-letters from farmers, lawyers, housewives, ministers, liv-
ing in all parts of the country-has been received by Mrs. Roberta West Nicholson
.... .Indianapolis News, Jan. 31, 1935, at 3, col. 2.
371. A VALENTINE DAY SENTIMENT
Indianapolis Times, Feb. 14, 1935, at 14, col. 4.
372. See Heart-Balm Act, ch. 208, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009 (presently codified at Ind.
Code § 34-4-4-1 (1982)).
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Jersey (June 27), Illinois (July 1), and Alabama (September 7).373
More striking, however, is the number of states that considered,
but failed to pass anti-heart balm bills: of the twenty-three states
whose legislatures entertained such bills in 1935, only eight en-
acted them before 1950.374
In 1935, two main explanations were given for the need to
abolish heart balm actions. First, the availability of such an action
lent itself too readily to blackmail,375 or as Roberta West Nichol-
son colorfully put it, "itching palms in the guise of aching
hearts."376 Second, a monetary damage award was said to be inap-
propriate for emotional injury.377 The widespread publicity given
to suits involving sexual relations also played a role, both in facili-
tating (supposed) blackmail and in upsetting moral scruples. 378
Additionally, "unscrupulous jackleg lawyers" 3 79 were attacked as
fostering heart balm litigation for their own meretricious ends. 38 0
373. See supra note 237.
374. Seven states passed anti-heart balm bills in 1935: Alabama, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. See supra note 237 and ac-
companying text. Fifteen states entertained but failed to enact proposed legislation:
Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Car-
olina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See supra note 240. Of the 15 states with unsuccessful 1935 bills, Wisconsin was
first to remedy the situation in 1959. Act of Oct. 28, 1959, ch. 595, § 73, 1959 Wis.
Laws 740, 765 (presently codified at Wis. Stat. Ann. § 768.01 (West 1981)); see also
supra note 267. No other state followed until Oregon in 1975. Act of July 2, 1975,
ch. 562, 1975 Or. Laws 1285 (presently codified at Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 30.840, 30.850
(1983)).
375. Senator McNabe (sometimes reported as "McNaboe"), sponsor of the New
York bill, said such suits "in many instances border on blackmail." Indianapolis
Times, Mar. 4, 1935, at 6, col. 3. Representative Bauer of Indiana said of that state's
bill: "Such a law will stop many shake-downs." Indianapolis News, Jan. 24, 1935, at
5, col. 2.
376. Indianapolis News, Feb. 2, 1935, at 3, col. 3 (speech in support of Indiana's
anti-heart balm bill, Feb. 1, 1935).
377. Nicholson stated: "There is no cash value on misconduct and I submit to
you that love and respect and affection are not transferrable, negotiable commodi-
ties--certainly not recoverable in a court of law." Id. Similarly, she declared:
"Surely a suit to recover money as damages for the broken romance cannot soothe
a woman if love was genuine." Time, Feb. 18, 1935, at 16, col. 1. Senator McNabe,
in response to protests that anti-heart balm statutes would obstruct justice, re-
torted: "Do you think money will bring back virtue?" Indianapolis Times, Mar. 25,
1935, at 6, col. 2. Feinsinger, supra note 2, at 979.
378. Feinsinger, supra note 2, at 1009. "[S]uits of this sort, with their attendant
publicity, are a detriment to public morals and induce a sordid and vulgar concep-
tion of marital affairs, in the minds of the immature." Indianapolis Star, Feb. 2,
1935, at 8, col. 2 (statement by Nicholson); see also Indianapolis News, Feb. 2, 1935,
at 3, col. 3.
379. Indiana's Senator Wade, speaking in support of the bill: "Thousands on
thousands of dollars are being taken by unscrupulous jackleg lawyers in such cases
.... " Indianapolis News, Mar. 8, 1935, at 1, col. 5.
380. "Decent attorneys do not accept suits of this type . Talcott Powell, A
Merit System, Indianapolis Times, Feb. 18, 1935, at 6, col. 2.
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In support of this and the blackmail contention, Nicholson even
argued that "at least 90 per cent of these cases never get to
court."381
Although these arguments may account for the widespread
publicity given to the 1935 anti-heart balm movement, they
scarcely account for either its arising at that time, or its very lim-
ited success. 382 Absent a special suitability for publicity, heart
balm actions no more lend themselves to exploitation by black-
mailers than other tort actions. Yet the public's taste for pruri-
ence and the media's willingness to satisfy it was peculiar neither
to those states that joined Indiana in banning heart balm actions,
nor to 1935. Examples of highly publicized heart balm actions oc-
cur in the eighteenth,38 3 nineteenth,38 4 and early twentieth 38 5 cen-
turies. Yet none of these periods generated the least movement to
abolish heart balm causes of action.
As for extortion and blackmail, any available cause of action
can be misused for such purposes.38 6 A lawyer also is surely not to
381. Indianapolis Star, Feb. 2, 1935, at 8, col. 2; see also Indianapolis News, Feb. 2,
1935, at 3, col. 3.
382. Feinsinger calls these the "surface explanation[s]," but although he suggests
an "underlying explanation" similar to that offered below, the "surface explana-
tion" is the only one he develops. See Feinsinger, supra note 2, at 979.
383. The 18th-century criminal conversation action, Cibber v. Sloper, Selwyn's
Nisi Prius, 10 (1738) (referred to by Lord Kenyon in Dubberly v. Gunning, 4 T.R.
654 (1792)), involving a renowned beauty and popular actress, would seem difficult
to surpass in lasciviousness or notoriety. The attendant publicity gave a great boost
to the career of Lord Mansfield, one of the barristers involved. 3 Lord John Camp-
bell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England 234-35 (1874). Another criminal
conversation case was sufficiently notorious to make its way into popular fiction.
See Herman Melville, Moby Dick 574 (1930). Melville took his information from 2
William Scoresby, An Account of the Arctic Regions, With a History and Descrip-
tion of the Northern Whale-Fishery 518-21 (1820). The case actually discussed was
Gale v. Wilkinson. It does not appear to have been reported; Scoresby got his copy
of the opinion from Gale. Id.
384. In the 1870s the "Beecher-Tilton trial [was] an alienation of affection suit so
full of salty detail that it kept the country enthralled for 16 glorious weeks." Tan-
nahill, supra note 317, at 397. The New York Times carried detailed reports almost
daily from July 13 through September 10, 1874 and occasionally thereafter through
the end of that year. For a contemporary feminist commentary on the Rev. Henry
Ward Beecher's behavior, see Victoria Woodhull, Vindication of the Beecher-Tilton
Scandal, in Root of Bitterness 256 (Nancy F. Cott ed. 1972), reprinted from The
Beecher-Tilton Scandal Case: The Detailed Statement of the Whole Matter by Mrs.
Woodhull, Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, Nov. 2, 1872, at 9-13.
385. The 1912 Ohio seduction case, Young v. Corrigan, 208 F. 431 (N.D. Ohio
1912), labeled by the judge as reeking of extortion, blackmail, and worse, achieved
widespread publicity.
386. Frederick L. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 63, 66
(1936). With respect to seduction there are only two reported cases in the United
States that make any mention of blackmail or extortion: Morgan v. Yarborough, 5
La. Ann. 316 (1850); Young v. Corrigan, 208 F. at 431. Seduction is surely at least as
suitable a vehicle for extortion as any of the heart balm causes.
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be censured for using a legislatively and judicially approved cause
of action to his or her client's benefit.387 As for the inadequacy of
a monetary award as a remedy for loss of virtue or spouse, or for a
broken heart, surely the same argument applied then, as it does
now, to a great many tort actions. Yet monetary damages are the
primary form of remedy presently accepted and used in this soci-
ety. Finally, had all these explanations, separately or collectively,
been sufficient grounds for abolishing heart balm actions, then the
abolition should have been more widespread than in fact it turned
out to be. The failure of fifteen of the twenty-three legislatures
that contemplated anti-heart balm bills in 1935 to allow their pas-
sage in itself belies both the validity and the persuasiveness of
these explanations.
Yet the inadequacy of these contemporary explanations of
the anti-heart balm movement of 1935 does not mean that they
should be ipso facto dismissed. Such explanations themselves are
a part of, and symptomatic of, the cultural milieu in which they oc-
curred. To be effective at the time, these arguments had to meet a
receptive audience, an audience whose values and social concep-
tions would make the objective agreeable even if the arguments
themselves were not independently adequate. The key to this par-
tial revolution in the law of seduction thus lies in the change in
the prevalent conception of woman, her role in society, sexual re-
lations, and the family. What had happened in society since 1920
to bring about the requisite change?
In order to understand the changes in the myth of the ideal
woman that prevailed in the 1930s, it is necessary to look back to
the immediate post-World War I, post-emancipation period. "His-
torians have long recognized that, for better or worse, American
culture was remade in the 1920's. Robust with business styles,
technologies, educational policies, manners, and leisure habits
which are identifiably our own, the decade sits solidly at the base
of our culture."388 Perhaps most of all, the 1920s was a decade of
revolution in sexual mores.38 9 This was a period of "immense pre-
387. Contrary to Talcott Powell's suggestion, supra note 380, it is not the inde-
cent but the professionally irresponsible lawyer who would refuse to make use of
available law for his or her client.
388. Paula S. Fass, The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the
1920's, at 3 (1977). This book presents one of the most detailed and comprehensive
accounts of the change in societal values in the 1920s.
389. "Students of modern sexual behaviour have quite correctly described the
twenties as a turning point, a critical juncture between the strict double standard of
the age of Victoria and the permissive sexuality of the age of Freud." Fass, supra
note 388, at 260.
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occupation with sex," 3 9 0 in literature, conversation, and behav-
ior.391 It was also the period during which the first and, because of
its ultimate success, the only major campaign to introduce Ameri-
can women to contraception took place.392 By the end of the dec-
ade, the old Victorian concept of female morality-of "sexual
purity and sacrifice"393-had been abandoned in favor of a new,
equalitarian view. Women sought, and to a marked extent
achieved, substantially the same sexual freedoms as had previously
been enjoyed only by men.394 "Women born after the turn of the
century were twice as likely to have experienced premarital sex as
those born before 1900, and the critical change occurred in the gen-
eration which came to maturity in the late teens and early
1920's." 39 5 The revolution was in both behavior and the prevailing
mythology.
The sexual liberation of women in the 1920s was not a prod-
uct of the movement that had produced emancipation: quite the
contrary. Suffragists had campaigned not on the basis of sexual
equality, but on women's moral superiority.396 They had sought
the vote, not equality. After emancipation the suffragist move-
ment's main achievement-protective legislation-was felt by
many equalitarian feminists to be patronizing. 397 According to the
older suffragist argument, sexual equality for women was not lib-
390. Walter Lippman, A Preface to Morals 285 (1929).
391. Id. at 284-92; see also Fass, supra note 388, at 260; Rothman, supra note 329,
at 177-218; Chafe, supra note 362, at 94-95; Robert S. Lynd & Helen Merrell Lynd,
Middletown: A Study in American Culture 137-46 (1929) [hereinafter Middletown].
The last cited work, the first of the justifiably famous Middletown series, is a report
of an intense study of social relations in Muncie, Indiana in the mid-1920s. The
cited passage is especially useful for its comparison with 1890s courting practices.
392. David M. Kennedy, Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret
Sanger (1970). Writing in 1929, Walter Lippman argued that contraception was a
major cause of the sexual liberation of women in the 1920s. Lippman, supra note
390, at 288-92; Margaret Sanger herself argued (among many other arguments) that
the role of contraception in "free[ing] the mind of sexual prejudice and taboo" was
"most important of all." Margaret Sanger, Pivot of Civilization 244 (1923).
393. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct 295 (1985).
394. Rothman, supra note 329, at 177-218; Chafe, supra note 362, at 94-95.
395. Chafe, supra note 362, at 95. Lippman argues that this revolution may have
been more in conversation and literature than in actual sexual behaviour. Lipp-
man, supra note 390, at 286; see also Paul A. Carter, Another Part of the Twenties
(1977). Chafe also notes that "[tihere was no way of knowing how many young wo-
men actually behaved in the manner described in magazine articles, and some de-
gree of skepticism was probably warranted." Chafe, supra note 362, at 94. He goes
on, however, to cite a 1938 survey-Lewis M. Terman, Psychological Factors in
Marital Happiness 321 (1938)-which found that of women born between 1890 and
1900, 74% were virgins at marriage, while of women born after 1910, 31.7% were!
Chafe, supra note 362, at 95.
396. See supra notes 354-58 and accompanying text.
397. Nancy F. Cott, Feminist Politics in the 1920s: The National Woman's
Party, 71 J. Am. Hist. 43, 53 (1984).
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eration but degradation: it brought women down to the level of
men.398 The suffragist movement, however, failed to maintain its
momentum through the 1920s,399 and with the repeal of the Shep-
pard-Towner Act in 1927,400 it lost the last vestiges of influence.40 '
The new feminists, the sexual equalitarians, did not fare
much better politically. Professor Smith-Rosenberg argues co-
gently that female sexual liberation was a key to the traditional
male politicians' defense against the potential power of women
voters.40 2 By characterizing women political reformers as either
aggressive lesbians or frustrated, man-hating spinsters, 40 3 men had
"redefined the issue of female autonomy in sexual terms."4 0 4 This,
of course, required male acquiescence in a measure of female sex-
ual liberation. Women bought the argument, transforming the
drive for political liberation and equality into a drive for sexual
liberation, "the right to sexual experimentation and self-
expression."40 5
Whatever the merits of this argument, by the end of the dec-
ade the sexually liberated "flapper" had become the norm.406 A
"revolution in morals and manners had occurred in America," 407
but it was not a revolution that gained women any significant so-
cial, economic, or political equality.
The daughter's quest for heterosexual pleasures, not the
mother's demand for political power, now personified female
freedom. Linking orgasms to chic fashion and planned moth-
398. Rothman, supra note 329, at 178; Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 393, at 296;
Chafe, supra note 362, at 96.
399. Chafe, supra note 362, at 25-33.
400. Sheppard-Towner Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921), repealed by Act of Jan.
22, 1927, ch. 53, § 2, 44 Stat. 1024. See supra text accompanying note 361.
401. "The rejection of the child labor amendment signaled the end of the flush
times of social feminism and the beginning of famine years." J. Stanley Lemons,
The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s, at 228 (1973). This period also
saw the introduction and failure of the first equal rights amendment. See Cott,
supra note 397, at 56-68.
402. Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 393, at 281-96.
403. "Plus ca change ...." Cf. supra note 323 and accompanying text.
404. Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 393, at 282-83.
405. Id. at 284. "Sexuality was the critical issue for this generation of New Wo-
men. They linked it with identity and with freedom." Id. at 292.
406. "They lived for fun and freedom, which was seen in terms of automobiles,
short skirts, cigarettes, speakeasies, jazz, and wild new dances like the Charleston."
Robin Franklin & Tasha Lebow Wolf, Remember the Ladies: A Handbook of Wo-
men in American History 72 (1984). See generally Fass, supra note 388, for a de-
tailed account of young people in the 1920s. This trend upset traditional feminists
who saw it as aimless and non-purposive. Chafe, supra note 362, at 92-94. Students'
loss of interest in social causes and increasingly private, selfish orientation was re-
flected in college curricula as well as in social organizations. Rothman, supra note
329, at 180-84.
407. Chafe, supra note 362, at 94.
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erhood, male sex reformers, psychologists, and physicians
promised a future of emotional supports and sexual delights to
women who accepted heterosexual marriage-and male eco-
nomic hegemony. Only the "unnatural" woman continued to
struggle with men for economic independence and political
power. 408
By the end of the 1920s the feminist movement toward equality
was a palpable failure.4 09
Woman's role, status, and image need not have remained
thus. Sexual liberation might have been just a first step in a move-
ment toward more general equality,410 had it not been for the ad-
vent of the great depression of the 1930s. 411 "[J]ust as suddenly as
she emerged, the 'new' woman seems to have disappeared-a casu-
alty, it would seem, of the Great Crash of 1929, quickly replaced by
the 'forgotten man' of the thirties."4 12 Priorities changed. Wo-
men's lot in life was of relatively little importance to a society
faced with massive unemployment. Women were driven from the
job market to make way for men,413 and, to further that end, the
older domestic female image returned. "Congresswoman Florence
Kahn spoke for most of her colleagues when she declared that 'wo-
man's place is not out in the business world competing with men
who have families to support,' but in the home." 41
4
Thus, an increase in autonomy and freedom in sexual and so-
cial mores was the only benefit of the 1920s revolution that women
carried with them into the depression of the 1930s.4 15 The tradi-
tional social structure remained essentially intact: women were
socially, economically, and politically the dependents of men.
4 16
"[T]he cultural pattern dinned into Middletown's girls and women
408. Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 393, at 283.
409. Cott, supra note 397, at 56-68; Chafe, supra note 362, at 29-47; Smith-Rosen-
berg, supra note 393, at 296; Rothman, supra note 329, at 218.
410. It is incorrect to say that United States feminism "collapsed and died" in
the 1920s; rather, it just paused. Lemons, supra note 401, at vii.
411. Chafe, supra note 362, at 107.
412. Susan D. Becker, The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment: American
Feminism Between the Wars 6 (1981).
413. Chafe, supra note 362, at 107-09.
414. Id. at 107.
415. Robert S. Lynd & Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown in Transition: A Study
in Cultural Conflicts 176-80 (1937) [hereinafter Lynd & Lynd]. This 1935-36 follow-
up study of Muncie, Indiana, provides a perceptive and timely analysis of the
changes that had taken place between 1925 and 1935. Cf. Middletown, supra note
391.
416. See Lemons, supra note 401, at 228-44. Illustrative is the lack of independ-
ent identity accorded Roberta West Nicholson by the press: she is identified, not
solely as the Democratic representative of Marion (as would any of her male coun-
terparts), but as "daughter-in-law of Author-Diplomat Meredith Nicholson" and
"ten years married and mother of two." Time, Feb. 18, 1935, at 16, col. 1.
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on every hand has no uncertainty as to their different and secon-
dary role, and shows no appreciable change since 1925."417 But
economic dependence in particular denied the completeness of wo-
man's sexual emancipation. 4 18 Unless she was free to live and sup-
port herself as she chose, independently, she could not be sexually
autonomous. "By that standard, women in 1940 were still far from
being free."419
This, then, was the conception of womanhood that prevailed
in the mid-1930s when legislatures began to contemplate a change
in traditional heart-balm law, including the tort of seduction. Wo-
man had the right to vote, she may have been somewhat sexually
liberated, and contraception may have freed her from the major
personal risks of intercourse, but in all other significant respects
she remained inferior-the economic, social, and political depen-
dent of man. Yet, for the heart-balm actions to remain viable, it
was essential that woman also not be sexually autonomous. Ex-
cept for alienation of affections, all the heart-balm causes of action
were against men who had taken advantage of women-women
who were thus perceived as incapable of looking out for them-
selves in such respects. The sexually autonomous woman brooks
no such patronizing.
It is this development in the sexual autonomy of women that
made possible the 1935 legislative reforms in the tort of seduction.
Fittingly, the reforms were introduced primarily by women lead-
ers.420 Roberta West Nicholson, the pioneering Indiana congress-
woman, also saw heart balm law reform as a matter of woman's
rights, although she did not make this the main focus of her
speeches. For example, in her speech before the final vote in the
Indiana Congress, she said: "We have an opportunity to pass a
piece of progressive legislation, in keeping with the times.... Wo-
men do not demand rights, gentlemen, they earn them, and they
ask no such privileges as these which are abolished in this bill."421
Opposition to the Indiana anti-heart balm bill came from
417. Lynd & Lynd, supra note 415, at 180. The Lynds quote a 1932 editorial:
"Women . . . accept general standards of values men have set. They take their
views of life as a hand-me-down from men and model their demands on life by
those of men." Id.
418. Chafe, supra note 362, at 109.
419. Id.
420. See supra notes 245-47 & 368 and accompanying text.
421. Indianapolis News, Feb. 2, 1935, at 3, col. 3. An earlier columnist wrote:
"[Roberta West Nicholson's] action is a tribute to the average modern woman of in-
telligence, who has proved herself as able as her masculine counterpart to with-
stand the ordinary slings and arrows of mundane existence-without the aid of the
courts." Indianapolis News, Jan. 28, 1935, at 6, col. 6.
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male senators and was in terms of women's perceived lack of inde-
pendence, judgment, and capability. Republican Senator William
P. Dennigan spoke in exactly such terms: "Do you mean to tell me
you will help women by taking away their civil rights against phi-
landerers and men who prey upon them?"422 The test, then, lay in
the conception of woman prevalent among the legislators: was she
sufficiently emancipated to make responsible decisions as to sexual
behavior herself, or did the Victorian image of the angelic victim
still hold sway? In Indiana and six other states in 1935, the former
conception prevailed.423
Significantly, legislators on both sides of this issue agreed
that, because of youth and inexperience, young women might still,
unwittingly, fall victim to the wiles of experienced men. Accord-
ingly, seduction of women below the age of majority was singled
out for preservation as a civil cause of action. 424 This exception
emphasizes the critical role of the sexual emancipation of adult
women in the general abolition of heart balm actions.
What, then, of the popular arguments that heart balm actions
were given excessive publicity and thus lent themselves unduly to
blackmail?425 As noted above, such actions had always been well
publicized without thereby engendering any change in heart balm
law.426 Thus, the question becomes: why should such publicity be
thought so harmful in 1935? The answer again lies in the sexual
liberation of women, either in reality or, more importantly, in the
popular conception. Prior to World War I, the women who became
involved in such publicized actions could only be "creatures of an-
other stamp."427 Only the true meretrix would exploit her honor
for pecuniary gain; the girl next door could only be an innocent
victim. In the Victorian image, the girl next door would no more
fuck her neighbor than show her knees or smoke a cigarette in
public. After the revolution in social and sexual mores of the
1920s, all of these became-again, in the popular conception, if not
always in reality-viable possibilities. Thus the publicity that had
422. Indianapolis Star, Mar. 8, 1935, at 11, col. 3.
423. Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Penn-
sylvania all abolished or eliminated heart balm actions. See supra note 237 and ac-
companying text. California, Colorado, Florida, and Massachusetts had followed
suit by the end of World War II. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
424. See, e.g., a description of the Indiana, Alabama, California, and Michigan
statutes, supra note 249. New York and New Jersey made no exception for
younger women, and Pennsylvania and Illinois did not abolish seduction, only the
other heart balm actions. See supra note 237.
425. See supra notes 375-77 & 381 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
427. Oliver Goldsmith, She Stoops to Conquer, act 1, scene 1 (1773).
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hitherto been of other, inaccessible social worlds, now was brought
closer to home. Accordingly, New York's Senator McNabe, in pro-
moting New York's anti-heart balm bill, used not a glamorous and
notorious Hollywood story,428 but a suit by a secretary against her
former employer.
Consider, for instance, the suit recently filed in a middle-West-
ern court by a young woman who wants $100,000 from her for-
mer boss for breach of promise. According to her suit, from
1928 to the end of 1934, the boss promised to marry her. At
the end of 1934 he changed his mind. By her own admission,
this young woman played along with her boss for close to six
years. Any girl intelligent and self-respecting enough to make
her own way in the world might have been expected to smell a
rat long before the boss broke the bad news.42 9
The general lack of success of the anti-heart balm movement
still requires explanation. All of the above-mentioned social
changes took place nationwide. They were not exclusive to a
handful of midwestern and eastern states. The partial success, but
predominant failure, of the anti-heart balm movement is probably
best explained by the partial success, but predominant failure, of
the woman's equalitarian movement. Women had made great
strides in sexual autonomy, but remained far short of equality
with men.430 In all other spheres, woman's progress from 1920 to
the mid-1930s had been minimal.431
Sexual autonomy could not be divorced entirely from depen-
dence in all other spheres. Women were probably still seen as rel-
atively incapacitated creatures, needful of the patronizing
protection of men, and, where that might fail, of the legal system.
It is also probable that, despite the early publicity, abolishing heart
balm actions was not very high on the male legislator's agenda.
The Ohio bill, for example, seems to have died from inertia rather
than opposition, despite the flurry with which it was introduced.
Throughout the period between the two world wars, there
was very little significant appellate action in the tort of seduction.
Indeed, if the level of appellate activity is indicative of the level of
litigation, then seduction had fallen into relative desuetude. Such
is to be expected, given the development in the popular image of
woman. As in the nineteenth century, the courts did not follow
428. The personal affairs of stage and screen stars were as popular in the 1930s
as in the 18th century, see supra note 383, or the present. See, e.g., Indianapolis
Times, Mar. 25, 1935, at 1, col. 2.
429. Indianapolis Times, Mar. 4, 1935, at 6, col. 3. This passage illustrates well
many of the points made above.
430. See supra notes 415-19 and accompanying text.
431. Id.
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the lead of the legislatures. Rather, in the few opportunities
presented them, they upheld the earliest United States form of the
tort.432 Male judges, when called upon to look, kept their gazes
fixed firmly on the past.
The depression of the 1930s halted any progress that women
may have been making toward general equality, either in fact or
popular conception. Only a measure of sexual liberation had been
permanently established. World War II followed, and women who
had been driven from the job market during the previous decade
were welcomed back in unprecedented numbers and in unprece-
dented roles.433 While there had been no net change in the per-
centage of women working between 1910 and 1940, the number of
working women increased by 50% during the war.4 34 Of necessity,
many women filled traditional male roles.435 "The ease with
which women assumed their new responsibilities challenged many
of the conventional stereotypes of women's work."4
36
While in reality women may have been doing work hitherto
preserved for men, their image in those jobs was kept in line with
prewar stereotypes. Women were not admitted into the profes-
sions in significantly greater numbers, 437 and jobs that previously
promised upward mobility were reclassified. 438 From its begin-
ning, the temporary nature of this burst of female employment
was recognized and preserved. Official policy, for example, re-
quired that child care facilities not be placed too close to the place
of employment lest they be "too convenient, outlive the emer-
gency, and encourage women to stay at work."4 39 While the actual
employment pattern changed, the popular image of women as eco-
nomically, physically, and socially second to and dependent upon
men was determinedly preserved.
It is now familiar history that at the end of World War II, wo-
men were forced out of their temporary employment to make way
432. For example, in 1939 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the right of a fa-
ther to recover for the seduction of his daughter. Shaw v. Fletcher, 138 Fla. 103,
189 So. 678 (1939). The court, however, refused to extend the right of action to the
seduced woman herself. Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 187 So. 620 (1939). It
should be noted that this case scarcely presented facts suitable for making such a
change even if the court had wanted to.
433. See Rothman, supra note 329, at 221-23.
434. Chafe, supra note 362, at 135.
435. Id. at 137.
436. Id. at 138.
437. Id. at 152.
438. For example, "skilled" work was reclassified "light and repetitive." Id. at
156.
439. Rothman, supra note 329, at 223.
19871
Law and Inequality
for the returning GI's.440 The old image of women as inferior to
men in all roles but those of wife and mother was reinforced by
the popular press and by respectable scientists. 441 The only groups
that seemed not to believe the propaganda were working women
themselves442 and high school girls.443 Women moved back into
the home, and the homes moved into the suburbs in an unprece-
dented fashion.444 Whether in advance of, or in justification of a
lot they could not avoid, women were forced to believe, along with
men, "the Hollywood-Victorian tradition that the state of marriage
was itself, in some mysterious way, sufficient recompense even for
a lifetime of incompatibility, recalcitrant children, petty back-
biting, financial stress, and endless boredom."445
Not surprisingly, the post-World War II era was not a period
of development in the tort of seduction. With the popular image of
women being determinedly returned to that of the turn of the cen-
tury, it could scarcely be expected that a legislature would treat
them to equality in their most personal relations. It is similarly
not surprising to find occasional cases of a traditional kind being
succesful on appeal.446 The most striking example is Blackman v.
Iles,447 in which an action by a parent for the seduction of her mi-
nor daughter was upheld, despite New Jersey's legislative abolition
of the cause of action.448 These were atavistic days for the concep-
440. Chafe, supra note 362, at 174; Rothman, supra note 329, at 222.
441. See, e.g., Ferdinand Lundberg & Marynia F. Farnham, Modern Woman:
The Lost Sex (1947). For discussions of popular views published in this period, see
Chafe, supra note 362, at 206; Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique 18-19 (1963).
Not all academics fell dutifully into line. See, e.g., Mirra Komarovsky, Cultural
Contradictions and Sex Roles, 52 Am. J. Soc. 184 (1946); Margaret Mead, What Wo-
men Want, 34 Fortune 172 (1946). For a useful discussion of the psychological the-
ories of women prevalent through 1960, see Naomi Weisstein, Psychology
Constructs the Female, in Woman in Sexist Society 207-22 (Vivian Gornick & Bar-
bara K. Moran eds. 1971).
442. Seventy-five percent of working women wanted to keep their jobs. Chafe,
supra note 362, at 178.
443. Eighty-eight percent of high school girls wanted careers. Id. at 179.
444. See generally Herbert Gans, The Levittowners (1967) (sociological study of
the postwar suburban development of Levittown, New Jersey).
445. Tannahill, supra note 317, at 404.
446. See Seamons v. Spackman, 81 Idaho 361, 341 P.2d 442 (1959); Fulgham v.
Gatfield, 72 Idaho 367, 241 P.2d 824 (1952); Collis v. Hoskins, 306 Ky. 391, 208 S.W.2d
70 (1948); Blackman v. Iles, 4 N.J. 82, 71 A.2d 633 (1950); Graham v. Smith, 46 Tenn.
App. 549, 330 S.W.2d 573 (1959); Caccamisi v. Thurmond, 39 Tenn. App. 245, 282
S.W.2d 633 (1955).
447. 4 N.J. 82, 71 A.2d 633 (1956); see supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
See also Note, Avoiding the Incidence of Anti-heartbalm Statutes, 52 Colum. L.
Rev. 242 (1952).
448. 4 N.J. at 82, 71 A.2d at 633. The Blackman position was limited to minors in
Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (1956). See supra note 266
and accompanying text.
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tion of womanhood.
Despite the pervasive popular mythology exalting the family
and woman's primary role in it, the reality of the gains made by
women in the 1940s was inescapable. 449 Women soon began to re-
turn to work, with the greatest change among married women.
450
Throughout the "baby boom,"4 5 1 women continued to enter the
workforce in increasing numbers. By 1960, forty percent of wo-
men over sixteen were employed, and the number of mothers at
work quadrupled.452 Most significantly, it became acceptable for
middle-class women to go to work.45 3 Educated, middle-income
women provided the greatest growth in employment. 454 World
War II had set in motion a change in women's attitudes toward
their role in society that the traditional mythology could not with-
stand. "Once women were propelled out of their traditional role,
they would not go back, and the change produced a series of conse-
quences which promised to alter the basic structure of relation-
ships between the sexes."455
The crushing boredom and the meaninglessness of their lives
created pervasive personal problems-"the problem that has no
name" as Betty Friedan dubbed it 456-for women who lived purely
according to the prevailing ideal.4 5 7 On the other hand, the clash
between reality and the prevailing mythology created significant
social and psychological tensions for educated women 458 and wo-
men forced by economic necessity to work. "Women found them-
selves having to work, while having to express a preference for
being full-time wives and mothers, or be thought abnormal. This
conflict adversely affected both their jobs and their homes."4 59 By
449. Chafe, supra note 362, at 181-95, 217-25; Rothman, supra note 329, at 229-31.
450. Chafe, supra note 362, at 181-82. For example, in California, twice as many
women were working in 1949 as has been in 1940.
451. Between 1940 and 1960, the birth rate doubled for third children, and trip-
led for fourth children. Id. at 217.
452. Id. at 218. This included mothers of young children: "In 1948, mothers of
preschool children made up 10 percent of all women workers; in 1960 they were 19
percent." Rothman, supra note 329, at 229. "[Thirty-nine] percent of women with
children aged six to seventeen had jobs." Chafe, supra note 362, at 218.
453. Chafe, supra note 362, at 183.
454. Id. at 218.
455. Id. at 224-25.
456. Friedan, supra note 441, at 15-32.
457. This problem was greatest among educated, middle-class women (from
whom Friedan collected much of her data). See Jo Freeman, The Politics of Wo-
men's Liberation 31 (1975).
458. See generally Mirra Komarovsky, Women in the Modern World: Their Edu-
cation and Their Dilemmas (1953). Predictably this period saw the rise of psychoa-
nalysis as a means of alleviating the tension, having the effect of keeping women in
their traditional roles. See generally Phyllis Chesler, Women and Madness (1972).
459. Freeman, supra note 457, at 26-27.
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the end of the 1950s, there was a legacy of "frustration and anger"
the result of which "would be the women's revolution of the
1960s."460
A healthy and growing economy, an active and effective
awareness of civil rights, and a socially engaged government in the
early 1960s provided the necessary environment for a renewal of
feminist activism.46 1 The society of the 1960s "was peculiarly at-
tuned to the need for guaranteeing equality .... Feminism be-
came a force to be reckoned with in American society." 462 The
addition of a ban of sex discrimination to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964463 may have been an accident;464 the birth of
the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966 was not.465
Sophisticated feminist activism, the reluctant support of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, a sharp increase in the ed-
ucation of women,466 and the increased availability of child care 467
made economic equality a serious possibility.468 The ready availa-
bility of the birth control pill, the most convenient mode of contra-
ception yet,4 69 and the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 470
gave women secure control over the choice to reproduce, absent
which sexual equality would never be possible.471 Thus "the femi-
nists of 1975 had accomplished as much in seven years as their suf-
fragist predecessors had accomplished in 70."472 Not only was this
460. Rothman, supra note 329, at 218.
461. Chafe, supra note 362, at 227, 232-37. Whether the civil rights movement
aided the women's movement is questionable. See Rothman, supra note 329, at 231-
32. But it both prepared the audience for equalitarian arguments and provided a
training ground for future feminist leaders. Freeman, supra note 457, at 27-28;
Chafe, supra note 362, at 232-37.
462. Chafe, supra note 362, at 227.
463. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
464. See Caroline Bird, Born Female: The High Cost of Keeping Women Down
1-18 (rev. ed. 1968), for a discussion of the addition of the word "sex" to title VII.
465. See Freeman, supra note 457, for a detailed account of the origins of NOW;
see also Betty Friedan, It Changed My Life 75-86 (1976) (NOW's original Statement
of Purpose is reproduced at 87-91).
466. Between 1960 and 1965, "the number of degrees earned by women went up
57 percent compared to only a 25 percent increase for men." Freeman, supra note
457, at 29.
467. Between 1965 and 1970 the number of three and four year olds in nursery
schools and kindergartens doubled, with the approval of 70% of the public. Chafe,
supra note 362, at 243.
468. See Rothman, supra note 329, at 231-42; Chafe, supra note 362, at 226; Free-
man, supra note 457, at 26.
469. Tannahill, supra note 317, at 406-21, argues that the birth control pill was
one of the most significant causes of the revolution of the 1960s.
470. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
471. See generally Betty Friedan, How to Get the Women's Movement Going
Again, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, (Magazine) 26, 98.
472. Tannahill, supra note 317, at 420.
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a practical achievement, it also produced a dramatic change in the
conception of women.
In sum, all of these elements ... contributed to the formula-
tion of a new definition of woman. They not only rendered
the concept of the wife-companion obsolete but offered an-
other one in its stead: woman as active, energetic, fully compe-
tent, and capable of self-definition as a person in sexual and in
social terms. Woman's essence was no longer to be found in a
household role but in her own achievements.473
A woman, thus conceived, could surely not be the victim of a
seducer's wiles. A person with intellectual and social faculties on
par with men, a person seen as responsible for her actions, sexu-
ally as well as economically and socially, does not fit this patroniz-
ing description.
It is not surprising, therefore, that another round of legisla-
tive abolition of seduction (and the other heart balm actions) be-
gan in the 1970s.474 Delaware was first in 1972,475 followed by
Washington in 1973476 and Alaska in 1974.477 Both Washington
and Alaska had previously passed statutes liberalizing the cause of
action, which they now amended so as to inhibit its future use.
478
Washington also made its surviving statute gender neutral.479
More drastic legislation in nine other states had, by 1983, abolished
or severely limited the cause of action for seduction. 480
Since 1970, there have been very few reported appellate deci-
sions of actions for seduction,481 and those that treat the cause of
473. Rothman, supra note 329, at 241-42.
474. See supra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
475. Act of July 5, 1972, ch. 489, 58 Del. Laws 1601 (presently codified at Del.
Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (1975)).
476. Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 154, § 5, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1118, 1125
(amending Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.020 (1963)).
477. Act of May 17, 1974, ch. 127, § 64, 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 127, p. 1, 12
(repealing Alaska Stat. § 09.15.030).
478. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. Note that Wisconsin abolished
action for breach of promise to marry in 1959. Act of Oct. 28, 1959, ch. 595, § 73,
1959 Wis. Laws 740, 765 (presently codified at Wis. Stat. Ann. § 768.01 (West 1981)).
There had been no legislative action in this field for 14 years before this abolition
and was to be no more for another 12 years; Wisconsin's legislation thus stands
alone.
480. Actions for seduction were limited or abolished in the following states: Del-
aware (1973), Oregon (1975), Oklahoma (1976), Virginia and Wyoming (1977), Min-
nesota and Ohio (1978), Georgia (1979), and North Dakota (1983). Ohio and
Oklahoma preserved the action for minor women and women of unsound mind.
See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
481. E.g., Greco v. Anderson, 615 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (applying Mas-
sachusetts law which abolished the cause of action); Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Piggott v. Miller, 557 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Mc-
Craney v. Flanagan, 47 N.C. 498, 267 S.E.2d 404 (1980); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d
1987]
Law and Inequality
action as still viable stand out like dinosaurs. The Missouri case of
Breece v. Jett 48 2 is the most interesting for its extension of the
right of action to the seduced woman herself.483 Amazingly, it was
the first case to do so in a pure seduction action.484 It took 125
years after the first such legislative action for a common law court
to follow suit! The case also provides an extensive discussion of
the state of the tort of seduction in modern common law, in the
course of which the wisdom of preserving the cause of action is re-
peatedly questioned. 48 5 The court, however, felt unable to take
the necessary leap and abolish it. "While we believe that an action
for seduction is socially unwise in modern society, we believe that
as an intermediate appellate court we cannot abolish the ac-
tion."48 6 The basis of the court's hostility to the tort was precisely
its enlightened view of the modern woman as fully emancipated
and responsible for her own actions:
The woman of today is not the woman of yesteryear. She has
a new-found freedom. The modern adult woman is sophisti-
cated and mature. The former notion that women belong to
the weaker sex has long been abandoned. The modern woman
is not "easily beguiled" and does not easily fall to the "wiles"
of man. Women desire and should be held to a reasonable
responsibility.487
IV. Conclusion
This article has argued that the law of seduction is responsive
to changes in the social conception of woman and her role-that is,
to the myth of the ideal woman. It is not social reality that legisla-
tures and courts react to, but social ideals. The prevailing myth,
not the prevailing fact, is the motor of change. "Men do not have
with myth a relationship based on truth but on use: they de-
politicize according to their needs." 48 8
As is shown in the third section, throughout the history of se-
duction, it was the idealized conception of woman, as found in
295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 199-206
and accompanying text.
482. 556 S.W.2d at 696.
483. Id. See supra notes 165-73 & 205-06 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the opinion.
484. See supra notes 118-73 and accompanying text.
485. For example: "Whether an action for seduction should be retained in con-
temporary society as a matter of judicial policy is highly questionable.... Recent
social trends and the changing mores of contemporary society concerning sex and
morality and the new found status of women may well make the action for seduc-
tion a remedy of a bygone era." 556 S.W.2d at 707.
486. Id. at 708.
487. Id.
488. Roland Barthes, Mythologies 144 (Annette Layers trans. English ed. 1972).
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literature, magazine articles, and social propaganda, that con-
trolled the development of the tort. This dominating myth was
the product of the middle classes and their social and economic
needs. That the poor women of the Victorian era worked long
hours in mills, wash houses, and the like mattered not to the prev-
alence or force of the myth. It was the middle-class myth that mo-
tivated the actions of legislatures, not the reality of the poor.
As the myth of true womanhood changed, the cause of action
for seduction changed with it. When the conception of women was
in terms of economic property, the tort was founded in the eco-
nomics of lost services. As this gave way to the ideal of woman as
morally angelic, physically frail, abhorrent of sex, and mentally
and physically incapable of resisting the overtures of men,48 9 so,
too, the cause of action changed from one for loss of services to one
for loss of virtue. When women finally achieved a serious and gen-
eral ideal (if not yet reality) of equality, the tort was abolished.
The concept of the emancipated, autonomous woman is incompati-
ble with the patronizing concept of victim of seductive male
devices.
The myth of the ideal woman changed along with variations
in other social exigencies. 490 The relation, however, runs both
ways: just as myth changes to justify reality, so too can a change in
myth change reality.491 As Roland Barthes writes:
[M]yth has the task of giving an historical intention a natural
justification, and making contingency appear eternal ...
What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, de-
fined, even if this goes back quite a while, by the way in which
men have produced or used it; and what myth gives in return
is a natural image of this reality.492
Should the image of the ideal woman change again, so too would
the law of seduction.
It is to be hoped that the major elements of equality for wo-
men have been indelibly written into our social mythology. It is,
however, far from clear that this is more than a hope. Without
economic autonomy women will never have full sexual autonomy.
Economic equality is far from a reality, and resistance to further
489. See supra notes 313-30 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 283-487 and accompanying text.
491. The intensive propaganda used after World War II to get women to return
home had this effect. See supra notes 440-45 and accompanying text. The reverse
efforts of the feminist movement since the mid-1960s have had a similar impact on
society, for example, opening it up to women professionals. Neither effort was a
complete success.
492. Barthes, supra note 488, at 142.
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progress is active.493 The converse would also seem true: without
full sexual autonomy, women will not be able to achieve economic
and social equality.
Unless women have absolute control over reproduction they
cannot be sexually autonomous, as free as and equal to men. Like-
wise, without absolute control over reproduction women cannot be
economically and socially autonomous, as free as and equal to men.
Thus, contraception and knowledge of it, and the right to abortion,
are critical to female equality. Contraception (and the availability
of abortion) allow women, like men, to limit the consequences of
their sexual behavior in time, and more importantly, their own
consciences. With contraception and abortion available, a woman
can confidently pursue life plans without the threat of total dis-
ruption from normal sexual behavior. Deny that choice, and phys-
iological differences once more invade social, political, and
economic domains to which they have no intrinsic relevance.
If contraception, or information on contraception, were de-
nied to women and the choice of abortion limited, then women
would be forced once more into a subservient role. Their biology
would once more control their destiny. In such circumstances, we
would expect a commensurate regression in the concept of the
ideal woman, and with it a return of seduction as a viable and ac-
tive cause of action.
At present, it appears unlikely that a reversion to the Victo-
rian conception of the ideal woman will be achieved by the polit-
ical efforts of anti-feminist groups.494 What, then, might bring it
about? Extreme pressure on the job market, such as that which
occurred in the 1930s and in the immediate post-World War II pe-
riod, might. In such an event, one would expect a resurgence of
emphasis on the value of the family.495 Social scientists might be
expected once again to find day care detrimental, and to suggest
that children will do better at home. That biology now in no way
requires it to be the mother, rather than the father, that takes re-
sponsibility for the home would, as in the past, be ignored. Ration-
ality has never been a critical element of arguments for inequality.
Organized feminism may thus be deprived of the best weapons for
combating such atavism.
493. See Sylvia Ann Hewlett, A Lesser Life: The Myth of Women's Liberation
in America 70-100 (1985).
494. However, the appearance of advertising extolling the virtues of woman's
role in the home is a contrary symptom. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13,
1986, at 32.
495. As in the past, support for "traditional family values" is being used as a
code for keeping women at home.
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Perhaps a more serious threat lies in the recent reappearance
of serious sexually transmitted diseases. In Victorian times, the
myth of virtue imposed upon women must have had the effect of
channeling childbearing and rearing into the appropriate social in-
stitution, the family. The first post-Victorian change in the myth,
the revolution in sexual mores of the 1920s, coincided with the
first widespread availability of contraceptives. The next great ad-
vance-that of the mid-1960s--coincided with the marketing of the
contraceptive pill and the increasing availability of abortion. Con-
cepts of female virtue thus seem to have been useful in controlling
sexual behavior when it could have results society was not pre-
pared to manage. If cures for genital herpes and Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome are not forthcoming, a reintroduction
of virtue in virginity would serve a similarly useful preventive
function. But would that virtue be of women only, or of both men
and women? There is nothing biological to require it to be of wo-
men only-as, arguably, there was in the past.496 Yet there is a
strong historical tradition of women acting not only as the guardi-
ans of morality, the repositories of virtue, but also the fomites of
vice. If women have indeed achieved a permanent equality, then a
revival of the notion of virtue in sexual purity would be gender
neutral. The tort of seduction would remain dormant, or, if re-
vived, exist in gender-neutral form.497 If, however, the ideal of
gender equality is not permanent, then women once again could be
subject to unequal restraints and a return to social inferiority.
With such inequality we could expect a return to viability of the
tort of seduction.
Over the last 200 years, the changes in the myth of the ideal
woman have been remarkable. Especially since 1920, this varia-
tion-almost decade by decade-has proven a most useful device
for preserving male political49s and economic hegemony. 499 It is
not necessary to posit a "male conspiracy" theory to explain this
history. New ideas will tend to be accepted only to the extent that
they fit the needs of the marketplace of ideas. That marketplace,
be it the politicians, the judiciary, or the press, has, historically,
496. Only women get pregnant.
497. The present Washington statute is gender neutral. See supra note 273 and
accompanying text.
498. See Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 393, at 282-84.
499. This does not appear true of the change to the Victorian ideal in the mid-
19th century. Unwanted pregnancy was, perhaps, the most oppressive of the bur-
dens on women. Smith-Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 320, at 343-47. Abor-
tion was commonplace, with estimates as high as one-third of all pregnancies
ending in abortion. Id. at 344. Thus use of the image of delicacy and aversion to
sex worked to women's advantage.
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been a male preserve. It is not surprising, then, that the most suc-
cessful developmental ideas were those that most furthered male
interests.
The history of the tort of seduction shows it to have been
adaptive to the prevalant myth of the ideal woman. Clearly the
tort was not the cause of the changes in that myth; changes in the
myth, themselves the result of changing social circumstances,
brought changes in the tort. The connection lies in society's mech-
anism for dissemination and popularization of social mythology-
the marketplace for ideas. If women are to control their lot in a
changing world they must remain active competitors in that
marketplace.
